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Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 4780 
VIRGINIA: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Supreme Court of Appeals at 
the Supreme Court of Appeals Building in the City of Rich-
mond on Monday the 23rd day of September, 1957. 
MUNDY MOTOR LINES, 
against 
Appellant, 
E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOUR.S AND COMPANY, Appellee. 
From the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond, Part II. 
Upon the petition of Mundy Motor Lines, a Virginia cor-
poration, an appeal was awarded it by one of the Justices of 
the Supreme Court of Appeals on September 17, 1957, from an 
order entered by the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond, 
Part II, on the 10th day of June, 1957, in a certain pro-
ceeding then therein depending wherein E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours and Company, a Delaware Corporation, was plain-
tiff and the said petitioner was defendant; upon the pe-
titioner, or some one for it, entering into bond with sufficient 
security before the clerk of the said Hustings Court in the 
penalty of five hundred dollars, with condition as the law 
directs. 
• • • • • 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
Record No. 4780 
VIRGINIA: 
In the Supreme Court of Appeals held at the Supreme 
Court of Appeals Building in the City of Richmond on 
Wednesday the 9th day of October, 1957. 
MUNDY MOTOR LINES, 
against 
Appellant, 
E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMP ANY, Appellee. 
Upon an appeal from an order entered by the Hustings 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part II, on the 10th day of 
June, 1957. 
This day came General Motor Lines, Incorporated, and the 
Intrastate Common Carrier Division of the Virginia Highway 
Users Association, by counsel, and presented their petition 
praying that they be permitted to intervene as parties to this 
cause and appear to be heard as parties in the litigation. 
Also came Mundy Motor Lines and E. I. du Pont de Nemours 
and Company and with consent of the Court filed their ob-
jections to the prayer of the petitioners. 
On consideration whereof, the prayer of the petitioners 
to intervene as parties to the litigation is denied, with leave 
granted to file a brief arnicus curiae . 
• • • 
2 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
RECORD 
Filed in the Clerk's Office the 21st day of December,_ 1956. 
Teste: 
CHAS. R. PURDY, Clerk 
By LOUISE C. FIELD, D. C. 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. 
To the Honorable M. Ray Doubles, Judge of the Hustings 
Court of the City of Richmond, Part II: 
The petitioner, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, 
a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State 
of Delaware, with its principal office in the City of Wilming-
ton, Dela ware, and duly qualified to do business in the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, represents to the Court, as follows : . 
1. The petitioner is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic 
fiber yarn at its plant at Martinsville, Virginia. The def end-
ant operates in the Commonwealth of Virginia as an intra-
state contract carrier by motor vehicle under permits issued 
by the State Corporation Commission of Virginia pursuant 
to the provisions of Chapter 12 of Title 56 of the Code of 
Virginia, 1950, as amended. 
2. As of October 15, 1956, the petitioner and the defendant 
entered into a certain written agreement whereby the defend-
ant agreed to provide the necessary equipment, employees 
and facilities and to load, transport, unload and safely deliver 
such shipments of synthetic fiber yarn as the pe-
page 2 r tioner might designate between petitioner's installa-
tions at Martinsville, Virginia, and Roanoke, Vir-
ginia. Petitioner agreed to tender to defendant for such 
transportation and delivery between said points a minimum 
of two truck loads per month of not less than twenty-five 
thousand pounds each. The term of said agreement was for 
one year from October 15, 1956, and thereafter until canceled 
by either party on ninety days written notice. A copy of said 
agreement is hereto attached as Exhibit ''A'' herewith. 
3. Petitioner agreed to pay to the defendant for its services 
"at a rate of Twenty-Two Cents (22c) per one hundred (100) 
pounds or the minimum rate, if any, required by Virginia law, 
whichever shall be greater,'' and in addition thereto such 
transportation tax or taxes as might be lawfully applicable, 
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subject to the minimum weight of 25,000 pounds per truck 
load and shipments provided by said agreement. 
4. The defendant entered upon the performance of its 
contract and pursuant thereto has transported for the pe-
tioner various truck loads of synthetic yarn of various weights 
from Martinsville, Virginia, to Roanoke, Virginia. The de-
fendant has billed the petitioner for said transportation at the 
rate of thirty-eight cents (38c) per one hundred pounds, which 
the defendant contends is the rate fixed by the State Cor-
poration Commission of Virginia for the transportation of 
the class of commodities including synthetic yarn by motor 
vehicle common carrier between Martinsville, Virginia, and 
Roanoke, Virginia, and, therefore, the minimum rate required 
for contract carriers by Section 46-2, Va. Code, 1950, as pro-
vided by the agreement of October 15, 1956. 
page 3 ~ 5. The defendant further asserts that the viola-
tion of Section 46-2, Va. Code, 1950, is declared to 
be a misdemeanor by Section 46-18, Va. Code, 1950, and that, 
though it has doubt as to the validity of Section 46-2, Va. 
Code, 1950, and as to its application to the service contem-
plated by the contract of October 1.5, 1956, it is unwilling to 
risk incurring the penalties provirled by Section 46-18, Va. 
Code, 1950, and that it ,,;ill not further perform the services 
contemplated by said contract unless petitioner agrees to 
recognize the said rate of 38 cents per 100 pounds for the 
transportation by motor vehicle common carrier between 
Martinsville, Virginia, and Roanoke, Virginia, of the class 
of commodities, including synthetic fiber yarn, as the rate 
required by Virginia law and, as such, the correct rate to be 
charged by contract carrier under said contract. Petitioner 
attaches hereto, as Exhibit "B" herewith, a copy of de-
fendant's letter of December 13, 1956, and as Exhibit "C" 
herewith, the petitioner's reply thereto, dated December 17, 
1956. 
6. An actual controversy now exists between the petitioner 
and the def Pndant with respect to the appropriate rate pro-
vided by said agreement of October 15, 1956, to be paid for 
the services rendered thereunder by the defendant to the 
petitioner and as to the validity of· Section 46-2, Va. Code, 
1950, and its applicability to said agreement of October 15, 
1956. 
7. The petitioner believes an<l tl1erefore avers that Section 
46-2, Va. Code, 1950, is in c-onflict with the provisions of Sec-
tion 156 (b) and ( c) of the Constitution of Virginia and, 
therefore, voi<l; that Section 46-2, Ya. Code, 1950, is vague, 
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indefinite and uncertain and, therefore, void and of 
page 4 ~ no effect; that .the application of Section 46-2, Va. 
Code, 1950, to the contract of October 15, 1956, in 
the manner contended for by the defendant will deprive the 
petitioner of its property without due process of law in viola-
tion of Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia and of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States; that Section 46-2 was originally adopted by Acts of 
Assembly 1932, Chap. 342, in violation of Section 52 of the 
Constitution of Virginia and was, the ref ore, void and was 
improperly and illegally included in Virginia Code of 1950; 
that, in any event, the provisions of Section 46-2, Va. Code, 
1950, are inconsistent with and necessarily repealed by Sec-
tion 56-276, Va. Code, 1950; that Section 46-2, Va. Code, 1950, 
does not require the defendant, or any other contract carrier 
by motor vehicle, to charge a rate for the transportation of 
synthetic fiber yarn from Martinsville, Virginia, to Roanoke, 
Virginia, which shall be not less than the rate charged for 
such transportation by motor vehicle common carrier; that no 
freight rate or charge has, in any event, been fixed by tl1e 
State Corporation Commission in the manner provided by 
law, or otherwise, for the transportation by motor vehicle 
common carrier of synthetic fiber yarn, or for any other 
commodity similar in classification, or otherwise, for any 
territory eml)racing Martinsville, Virginia, and Roanoke, 
Virginia, or for such transportation between the same; that 
Section 46-2, Va. Code, 1950, is wholly inapplicable to and 
has no bearing upon the transportation of synthetic fiber 
yarn as provided for in the agreement of October 15, 1956; 
that the rate sought to be charged by the defendant is not 
required by any valid Virginia. law; that there is no 
page 5 ~ minimum rate required by Virginia law for the 
transportation by motor vehicle contract carrier of 
synthetic fiber yam between Martinsville, Virginia, and Roa-
noke, Virginia; that the agreed rate of twenty-two cents 
per one hundred pounds set out in said agreement is not 
less than any minimum rate required by Virginia law since 
no minimum rate is applicable and is, therefore, the correct 
and proper rate to be charged thereunder; that the defend-
ant is not entitled to rely on Section 46-2, Va. Code, 1950, 
either as the basis for the rate sought to be charged by it 
for such transportation or as justification for refusing to per-
form the services thereby required at the rate of twenty-two 
cents per one hundred pounds. 
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WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and for 
as much as the petitioner is otherwise remediless, the pe-
titioner respectfully prays that after due hearing this Court 
enter a declaratory judgment construing said contract of 
October 15, 1956, and adjudicating that the State Corpora-
tion Commission of Virginia has fixed no rates for the trans-
portation of any commodity by motor vehicle carrier; that 
the State Corporation Commission has no authority or 
power to fix rates or charges of motor vehicle contract car-
riers in the transportation of any commodity in intrastate 
commerce; that Section 46-2, Va. Code, 1950, is void and of no 
effect; that there is no minimum rate or charge required 
by Virginia law for the transportation of any commodity by 
motor vehicle contract carrier; that the correct and proper 
rate chargeable to the petitioner by the defendant for the 
transportation of synthetic fiber yarn between Martinsville, 
Virginia, and Roanoke, Virginia, under said contract of Octo-
ber 15, 1956, is twenty-hvo cents; and that the 
page 6 ~ def end ant be enjoined from refusing- to perform 
the services provided to be performed by it under 
the agreement of October 15, 1956, in reliance upon Section 
46-2, Va. Code, 1950, until this Court shall have settled in 
tllis proceeding the controversy now existing- between the 
petitioner and the defendant and shall have determined the 
correct and proper rate chargeable for such services by the 
defendant to the petitioner. · 
page 7 ~ 
* 
AUBREY R. BOvVLES, JR. 
901 Mutual Building 
Richmond 19, Virginia. 
HENRY E. KETNER 
1001 State-Planters Bank Build-
ing 




AGREEMENT entered into as of the 15th day of October 
1956, by and between E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND 
COMP ANY, a corporation of the State of Delaware with 
general offices in vVilmington, Delaware, hereinafter ref erred 
to as DUPONT, and l\IUNDY MOTOR LINES, a corporation 
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of the State of Virginia, with principal office in Roanoke, 
Virginia, hereinafter referred to as the CONTRACTOR. 
"\VITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the CONTRACTOR represents to DUPONT 
that he is engaged in the business of transporting, for hire, 
goods, wares and merchandise within the State of Virginia, 
and has or will make available a sufficient number of motor 
vehicles of approved type and construction together with the 
necessary appurtenances, employees and equipment suitable 
and sufficient to properly and safely perform the services 
hereinafter referred to, and 
.. W'HEREAS, DUPONT desires to avail itself of the serv-
ices of the CONTRACTOR for the time and in the manner 
and upon the terms and conditions as hereinafter set forth, 
NO"\'i!,THEREFORE, the parties hereto have and by these 
presents do agree with each other as follows: 
1. THE CONTRACTOR agrees to provide the necessary 
facilities, and to load, transport, unload and safely deliver 
such shipments of Synthetic Fiber Yam as DUPONT may 
designate, between DUPONT'S installations at Martinsville, 
Virginia and Roanoke, Virginia. 
2. During the period of this Agreement DUPONT agrees 
to tender to CONTRACTOR a minimum of two (2) truck-
loads per month, each truck containing a minimum of twenty-
five thousand (25,000) pounds for transportation between tl1e 
points aforesaid. As compensation for the services 
page 8 ~ to be rendered by CONTRACTOR hereunder, DU-
PONT agrees to pay to CONTRACTOR at a rate 
of Twenty-Two Cents (22c) per one hundred (100) pounds 
or the minimum rate, if any, required by Virginia law, which-
ever shall be greater, subject to a minimum weight of twenty-
five thousand (25,000) pounds per shipment, together with 
such transportation tax as may be lawfully applicable there-
to. 
3. The CONTRACTOR agrees that all motor vehicles and 
other equipment used in pedorming the above services shall 
be maintained in proper and safe mechanical and physical con-
dition throughout, so tl1at the operation and use of said motor 
vehicles and equipment will not constitute a hazard of fire 
or other dange to DUPONT'S property( owned or leased), 
to DUPONT'S employees, or to the property of DUPONT'S 
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employees, in or about its plants or other places of business, 
or to the property and employees of DUPONT'S suppliers. 
4. DUPONT shall advise the CONTRACTOR as to the 
time and place where shipments of Synthetic Fiber Yarn 
shall be received and delivered, and the CONTRACTOR 
agrees to carefully observe all such instructions, but nothing 
herein contained shall be construed as a contract by DU-
PONT for the chartering, hiring or leasing of any motor 
vehicles or other equipment of the CONTRACTOR, nor 
shall any of tl1e agents, employees or servants of the CON-
TRACTOR be regarded as employees of DUPONT, it being 
understood that the CONTRACTOR is in all respects an 
independent contractor, and that DUPONT shall exercise no 
control over the operation of said motor vehicles or equip-
ment or over the agents, employees or servants of the CON-
TRACTOR. 
5. CONTRACTOR agrees to indemnify and save DUPONT 
harmless from any and all liability, loss, damage and expense, 
cause of action, suits, claims, judgments, including liability 
for injuries to or death of the agents, servants or 
page 9 ~ employees of the CONTRACTOR arising out of or 
as a result of the transportation of said Synthetic 
Fiber Yarn by CONTRACTOR as provided for herein. 
6. This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect 
for one year from October 15, 1956 and shall continue there-
after until either party shall cancel the same by ninety (90) 
days' advance written notice. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused 
this Agreement to be signed in duplicate by their duly author-
ized representatives as of the day and year first above writ-
ten. 
page 10} 
E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND 
COMPANY 
By /s/ J. W. BROWN 
Asst. Director-Traffic Department. 
MUNDY MOTOR LINES 
By /s/ J. R. WYATT 
Vice President. 
• 
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EXHIBIT ''B.'' 
Roanoke 3, Virginia 
December 13, 1956. 
Mr. Paul J. Keehan, Manager 
Trucking Division 
E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Company 
Wilmington, Delaware 
Re : Our Contract Oct. 15, 1956 
Roanoke-Martinsville 
Dear Mr. Keehan: 
My lawyer has brought to my attention the decision of our 
Supreme Court involving the Overnite Transportation Com-
pany and that Judge Buchanan in bis· opinion undertakes to 
say that the defendant, a contract carrier, operating under 
Sect. 56-289, Va. Code, '' hauls goods under special and 
individual contracts, Code Sect. 56-273 (f), and its rates are 
not subject to regulation by the Commission, Code Sect. 56-
273, bitt are subject to the statutory limitation srt forth in 
Sect. 46-2." 
I had never felt that Section 46-2 of the Va. Code applied 
to contract carriers and I believe that has been the attitude 
of most carriers by motor vehicle in this state for a long 
period of time. If contract carriers are subject to the pro-
visions of Sect. 46-2, Va. Code, it would also appear that they 
are subject to the penalties provided by Sect. 46-18 for the. 
violation of Sect. 46-2. 
It is not altogether clear to me what freight rate or charge 
is intended by Sect. 46-2 to constitute the floor, if any, be-
neath which rates may not be charged for the transportation 
of synthetic fiber yarn between Martinsville and Roanoke. 
It appears that the rail rate for that commodity in the rail 
rate territory embracing those points is 31 cents per 100 
pounds, minimum 24,000 pounds, and 26 cents per 100 pounds, 
minimum 60,000 pounds, for transportation from Martins-
ville to Roanoke and that the rate for common carrier bv 
motor vehicle is 38 cents per 100 pounds, minimum 20,000 
pounds, Martinsville to Roanoke. It likewise appears that 
the rail rate from Roanoke to Martinsville is the same but 
that the rate for common carrier by motor vehicle in that 
direction is 25 cents per 100 pounds, minimum 23,000 pounds, 
and 22 cents per 100 pounds, minimum 30,000 pounds. 
Mundy Motor Lines v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 9 
It is obvious that all of these rates are greater than the rate 
of the 22 cents specified by our contract. 
While our contract of· October 15, 1956, provides for the 
minimum rate required by Virginia law, if that be greater 
than 22 cents per 100 pounds, I am more concerned 
page 11 ~ by .the possibility of criminal prosecution under 
Sect. 46-18, if the 22 cents per 100 pounds rate 
specified by our contract is a violation of Sect. 46-2 under 
all the circumstances. , . 
I, the ref ore, regretfully advise you that unless you are pre-
pared to recognize the common carrier rate by motor vehicle 
of 38 cents per hundred pounds as the minimum rate required 
by Virginia law with respect to all future shipments under 
our contract of October 15, 1956, my company will not per-
form in the future any of the obligations imposed on it by 
that contract. 
Very truly yours, 
GAM:edm 
pag,e 12 ~ 
MUNDY MOTOR LINES 
GARDNER A. MUNDY 
President. 
EXHIBIT "C." 




Mr. Gardner A. Mundy, President 
Mundy Motor Lines 
P. 0. Box 331 
Roanoke 3, Virginia 
Re: Contract Oct. 15, 1956 
Roanoke-Martinsville 
Dear Mr. Mundy: 
Your letter of December 13, 1956, is acknowledged. 
We also have been advised of the decision of the Virginia 
Court in Overnite Transportation Co. v. Woodfin Brothers. 
We are advised, however, that the quoted language of Justice 
10 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia . 
Buchanan's opinion, underscored by you, may have been un-
necessary to a decision of the issue then before the court, 
and that a study of the history of Sect. 46-2 will convince 
that the section is not applicable to the issue between us as 
to whether there is a minimum rate required by Virginia 
law for the transportation by a contract carrier of our com-
modity between the points specified in the contract of October 
15, 1956. 
We fully appreciate your desire not to violate any criminal 
statute rendering you liable to fine or imprisonment. But 
you are also too well informed not to understand that our 
industry, operating under contract with you, should not be 
forced to bear the rate suggested by you nor should we be 
forced to the necessity of devising other services to take 
care of our transportation needs. 
Under the circumstances, it appears to us appropriate to 
seek an inm1ediate decision by the courts of this question so 
highly important to the shipping public as well as to you. 
For that purpose we shall request our legal department to 
take such action as promptly as possible. 
PJK:vt 
page 14 ~ 
Very truly yours, 
• • 
PAUL J. KEEHAN, Manager 
Trucking Division. 
• 
Filed January 9, 1957. 
T,este: 
CHAS. R. PURDY, Clerk 
By LOUISE C. FIELD, D. C. 
ANSvVER OF MUNDY MOTOR LINES. 
For its answer Mundy Motor Lines comes and says: 
(1) It admits the correctness of allegations in paragraphs 
1 to 6 inclusive of the petition. 
(2) Paragraph 7 of the petition primarily states the pe-
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titioner 's interpretation of certain sections of the Virginia 
Code 1950 and the Constitution of Virginia, and consequently 
the defendant neither affirms nor denies the interpretation 
adopted by the petitioner. 
(3) The defendant has always attempted to operate its 
business in strict compliance with all applicable provisions of 
law, including appropriate statutes, ordinances, the constitu-
tions of Virginia and the United States, and appropriate regu-
lations of governmental agencies having authority over its 
operations. 
( 4) It is not informed as to whether it is obligated under 
its agreement with the petitioner and the applicable law to 
charge 22 cents per hundred pounds or 38 cents per hundred 
pounds, but in order to be on the safe side and free of 
penalties and prosecution, it has determined that it should 
until directed otherwise charge the petitioner at the rate of 
38 cents per hundred pounds for the transportation of the 
class of commodities involved in the agreement, 
page 15 ~ and, consequently, it notified the petitioner to this 
effect. 
Respectfully, 
MUNDY MOTOR LINES 
By Counsel. 
WOODS ROGERS MUSE & WALKER 
301 Boxley Bldg., Roanoke, Va., 
Attorneys for Defendant . 
• • • I: 
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• • • • 
• 
• 
:MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The petitioner, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, 
Incorporated, represents to the court that it appears from 
the pleadings herein and from admissions made in the depo-
sitions and stipulations filed herein that no material fact 
is genuinely in dispute between the parties and that it is 
entitled to judgment in its favor and moves the court for 
summary judgment in accordance with the prayers of its 
petition pursuant to Rule 3 :20, Rules of Court. 
12 ·. . Supreme· 'court' of Appeals of Virginia 
Filed May 3, 1957. 
Teste: 
AUBREY R. BOWLES, JR. 
901 Mutual Building 
Richmond 19, Virginia. 
HENRY E. KETNER 
1001 State-Planters Bank Bldg. 
Richmond 19, Virginia 
Counsel for Plaintiff. 
CHAS. R. PURDY, Clerk 
By LOUISE C. FIELD, D. C . 
• • • • • 
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• • • • • 
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
The defendant, Mundy Motor Lines, moves the court that it 
be permitted to join in the motion for summary judgment 
made on behalf of the plaintiff, as there are ,no material facts 
in genuine dispute between the parties with respect to the 
issues involved in · this litigation; and accordingly this de-
fendant joins in the motion for summary judgment. 
Filed May 10, 1957. 
Teste: 
• 
page 19 ~ 
LEONARD G. MUSE 
301-319 Boxley Building 
Roanoke, Virginia. 
CHAS. R. PURDY, Clerk 
By LOUISE C. FIELD, D. C . 
• • • • 
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• • • • • 
10th day of June 1957. 
ORDER. 
This cause came this day to be heard upon the Petition 
for Declaratory Judgment, the Answer of the defendant, the 
exhibits, the Stipulations of the parties, the depositions filed 
herein, and the Motion for Summary Judgment; and the 
Court heretofore having heard the argument of counsel and 
taken the same under advisement; 
Now, therefore, for reasons set out in a written opinion 
of the Court, hereby filed as a part of the record, the Court 
being of opinion that the defendant is not required by law to 
charge any specified minimum rate for its services as a con-
tract motor vehicle carrier, and more particularly that Sec-
tion 46-2 of the Code of Virginia is unenforceable as against 
contract motor vehicle carriers, the Court doth ADJUDGE, 
ORDER and DECREE that the defendant is contractually 
obligated, pursuant to its contract of October 15, 1956, to 
transport for the plaintiff in accordance with the other 
provisions of the said contract at the specified contract rate 
of Twenty-two Cents (22c) per one hundred (100) pounds. 
To all of which foregoing action of the Court the defendant, 
Mundy Motor Lines, by counsel, objects and excepts. 
Enter this Order. 
• • • 
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Filed June 10, 1957 By Order. 
Teste: 
M. R. D., Judge . 
• • 
• 
CHAS. R. PURDY, Clerk 
By LOUISE C. FIELD, D. C. 
OPINION. 
14 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
DOUBLES, J. This is a proceeding for a declaratory 
judgment instituted by the plaintiff corporation ( a manu-
facturer and shipper) ag·ainst the defendant corporation ( an 
intrastate contract motor carrier) to determine the validity 
of a rate specified in a contract entered into between the 
parties on October 15, 1956, whereby the defendant agreed 
to transport synthetic yarn for the plaintiff between the plain-
tiff's installations at Martinsville, Virginia, and Roanoke, 
Virginia. 
The contract is for a term of one year and thereafter until 
either party gives notice of cancellation. The plaintiff agreed 
to ship a minimum of two truckloads per month, each ship-
ment containing a minimum of 25,000 pounds, and as com-
pensation agreed to pay the defendant" at the rate of Twenty-
Two Cents (22c) per one hundred (100) pounds or the 
minimum rate, if any, required by Virginia law, whichever 
shall be greater. '' 
Section 46-2 of the Code of Virginia, originally enacted 
in 1932 (Acts of 1932, p. 636), reads as follows: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, 
after receiving a license from the Commissioner ( of Motor 
Vehicles) as herein provided to transport any commodity 
in any territory at a less freight rate or charge than that 
fixed by the State Corporation Commission for a common 
carrier for the same commodity in the same territory.'' 
page 21 ~ This statute, for reasons to be commented upon 
later herein, had never been interpreted to apply to 
a contract motor carrier during the first twenty-three years 
it had been on the statute books. The first intimation that it 
had any such application appears in an isolated statement in 
the rase ,,f Orernite Transportation Compan.11 v. W oodftn 
Brothers, 196 Va. 747, where the Court, in considering another 
issue, remrirked ineidentally that contract motor carrier 
"rate8 are not suhfoct to regulation by the (State Corpora-
tion) Commission, Code Section 56-276, but are subject to the 
statutor-11 limitations set forth in 8 ection 46-2." (Italics 
supplied.) 
ThCl rates of com1non carriers either fixed bv or filed with 
the State Corporation Commission on the type of sl1ipment 
involved in the contract vary from 25 cents to 38 cents per 
hundred pounds depending on whether bv rail or hv motor 
carrier and whether from Martinsville to Roanoke. or vice 
i'ersa. 
In December, 1956, after two months of operation under 
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the contract, the defendant notified the plaintiff that having 
been informed of the remark in the Overnite Transportation 
Co1npany case, that contract carriers "are subject to the 
statutory limitation set forth in Section 46-2'' of the Code 
of Virginia, the defendant, fearful of possible criminal prose-
cution for alleged violation of the said statute, would no 
longer haul the plaintiff's yarn at the specified rate of 22 
cents per hundred pounds but only at 38 cents per hundred 
pounds. 
The present proceeding has been instituted by the plain-
tiff to obtain a declaratory judgment as to the controversy 
between the parties. The plaintiff contends that there is no 
minimum rate re1uired of a contract carrier under Virginia 
law, and that Section 46-2 of the Code is inapplicable, and if 
purports to he applicable then as to a contract carrier it is 
unconstitutional. 
page 22 ~ THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES. 
Section 156 (b) of the Constitution of Virginia clothes 
the State Corporation Commission with the power to control 
all transportation and transmission companies and tliat its 
authority to prescribe rates for such companies '' shall be 
paramount.'' The Commission may also be granted author-
ity by law to prescribe other rules and regulations for cor-
porations or other persons '' subject to the superior authority 
to 56-338, deals with '' Motor Vehicle Carriers Generally.'' 
Section 156 ( c) of the Constitution provides that additional 
power may he conferred upon the State Corporation Com-
mission by law to prescribe and enforce rates to be ob-
served by any business in the State '' where the state has 
the right to prescribe rates and charges in connection there-
with.'' 
The General Assembh· has implemented the above cited 
sections of the Constitution and spelled out the various fields 
of jurisdiction of the State Corporation Commission in a 
series of enactments. l\fany of these appear in Title 56 of 
the Code. Chapter 12 of Title 56 comprising Sections 56-273 
to 56-338, deals with '' Motor Vehicle Carriers Generally.'' 
Motor vehicle carriers are divided into three categories: 
(1) Common carriers, (2) restricted common carrier, and 
( 3) contract carrier. Section 56-273 ( d), ( e) and ( f). 
Section 56-276, adopted in 1936, provides that '' the Com-
mission shall supervise, regulate and control all motor car-
riers • * * in all matters relating to the performance of 
their pi1,blic duties and their charges therefor • • • pro-
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vided, however, that the Commission shall not have the 
power to reg·ulate or control the rates and charges of contract 
carriers by motor vehicle and it shall not require any reports 
from such carriers with respect thereto.'' (Italics 
page 23 ~ supplied.) 
·Thus the General Assembly has made it abund-
antly clear it does not intend that the paramount rate fixing 
body in the State~ viz. the State Corporation Commission, 
shall regulate the rates of contract carriers. There can be 
but two logical reasons for this prohibition: ( 1) that con-
tract carriers are so far removed from being affected with a 
public interest that the state itself has no right constitution-
ally to prescribe their rates and charges; or (2) that the 
General Assembly reserves to itself the power to regulate the 
rates of contract carriers. 
In 1932, prior to the adoption in 1936 of the l\fotor Vehicle 
Carriers Act the General Assembly had adopted a Motor Ve-
hicle Act designed to regulate the ree:istration, licensing and 
operation of motor vehicles gener~lly upon the highways. 
The orig·inal legislation was introduced ai;; House Bill No. 
339 and had nothing to do with the regulation or rates to be 
charged by motor carriers-but was directed at the other 
pl1ase of motor vehicle regulation, viz., that under jurisdic-
tion of the Motor Vehicle Department such as registration 
and licensing of all types of motor vehicles and the manner in 
which they should he operated on the highways. The bill 
as passed by the House was amended in the Senate. The 
House rejeeted the Senate amendments. A Conference Com-
mittee was appointed and there was proposed for the first 
time what hecame Section 33 1/2 of Chapter 342 of the Acts 
of 1932 and what is now Section 46-2 of the Code, the section 
now in controversy. 
As observc~l before, the section made it unlawful for any 
person, firm or corporation to transport anv commodity at a 
less freight rate than that fixed by the State Corportion 
Commission for a common carrier in the same territory. 
page 24 ~ THE EVIDENCE . 
. The witnesi;;, Charles L. Appenzeller, Assistant Traffic 
Manager of the nlaintiff companv, has been in the field of 
t~riff making and interpretation for a period of hventy-one 
years. 
The witness, Joseph R. Wyatt, vice-president of the de-
fendant company, has been engaged in the same field for 
twent)T-one years. 
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The witness, T. D. Geoghegan, is. a transportation expert 
of over fifty years experience in every conceivable phase of 
rate-making and interpretation thereof in both the federal 
and state fields. . 
Each of these witnesses reviewed in detail an exhibit of the 
rates of co1nmon carriers as they pertain to the transporta-
tion of '' synthetic fibre yarn'' between Martinsville and 
Roanoke. Several other exhibits were also comprehensively 
reviewed. Each was asked to determine under Section 46-2 of 
the Code of Virginia the minimum rate below which a con-
tract carrier should not charge. Each answered that it would 
be impossible and gave extended reasons why it would be 
impossible. Their reasons state the impossibility clearly, but 
from an examination of the wide differences of the rates 
charged by common carriers by rail on the one hand, by 
common carriers by motor vehicle on the other hand, it does 
not take an expert to conclude that the task is impossible. 
These experts testified that they had never before been pre-
sented with such an anomaly as that presented by the 
language of the statute; that the word "territory" used 
in the statute traditionally refers to railroad rates, whereas 
motor carrier rates are established from point to point and 
not by territory; that the phrase "common carrier" is in the 
singular, whereas we now have carriers by rail, water, motor 
vehicle, and airplance as well as by rail and motor express; 
that the State Corporation Commission does not 
pag·e 25 ~ ''fix" the rates of common carriers by motor 
vehicle, i. e., their rates become operative by 
filing, whereas the rates of common carriers . by rail are 
''fixed'' by Commission order after notice and hearing. 
Furthermore, some localities in Virginia are served by 
only one type of common carrier; some are served by two 
or more types; many by no common carrier at all. What 
would be the minimum rate found to be fixed in the latte:r,: 
case? 
In addition, the Virginia Code Commission will recommend 
the repeal of Section 46-2. It will do so for the presently 
expressed reason that it permits the Corporation Commission 
to fix the minimum rates for contract carriers and is in con-
flict with Section 56-276 which prohibits such fixing of rates. 
While the Court does not fully agree with the presently ex-
pressed reason of the Code Commission, i. e., the Court inter-
prets Section 46-2 to he self-operating and it is only by in-
direction that any action by the Corporation Commission in 
fixing a common carrier rate affects a contract carrier, never-
theless. the Court is of opinion that the General Assembly 
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by Section 46-2 purportedly is attempting to do indirectly 
by legislative fiat that which it has expressly prohibited by 
direct action. 
REGULATION OF RATES. 
Can the State of Virginia constitutionally regulate the 
minimum rates of a contract motor vehicle carrier? 
There is no question that whenever a business or other 
activity becomes so closely and intimately related to the 
public as to make the welfare of the public, or a substantial 
portion thereof, dependent upon the proper conduct of such 
business or activity, then it becomes subject to regulation 
under the police power of the .State. Thus the State can 
regulate the use of the highways by the operator of any 
motor vehicle whether for private use or other-
page 26 ~ wise. And if the operator is a common carrier, 
the State can not only regulate its use of the high-
way but can regulate the rates which it may charge the public 
for transport of freight. The purpose of such rate regulation 
is to protect the public from unreasonably high rates and 
from discrimination. 
But, there are two other material issues involved in the 
present case: (1) the regulation of Section 46-2 deals not 
with unreasonably "high'' rates, but with "minimum" rates; 
(2) the carrier involved is not a co11i1non carrier but a con-
tract caITier. 
Any type of regulation must be substantially related to 
a legitimate end sought to be attained. Etheredge v. Norfolk, 
148 Va. 795. Protection of the public from unreasonably 
high rates by a common carrier is obviously related to a 
legitimate end sought to be attained. But under what con-
ditions are minimum rates related to a legitimate end? 
The most illuminating discussion of this matter in Virginia 
is probably found in Reynolds v. Milk Corwniission (1935), 
163 Va. 957 in which the Court held the statute regulating the 
milk industry constitutional. That statute provided, among 
other things, for the fixing of minim nm and maximum rates 
for the sale of milk. The Court found in the preamble of the 
act an expressed legislative purpose to eradicate disparity in 
prices in order to stabilize the production and marketing of 
milk and to support the credit structure of the Commonwealth 
and its local sub-divisions. Under the facts in the case the 
proof was that in the vVaynesboro-Staunton area, the practice 
of price cutting by certain producers, who did not carrv 
over substantial surpluses of milk with the consequent los·s 
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of revenue, was threatening a demoralizing effect upon the 
larger producers who provided these surpluses as a guarantee 
to meet the varying daily public demand; that the burden 
of losses resulting from the carrying of such sur-
page 27 ~ pluses must be borne by all producers if the public 
was to be protected from the dangers incident to 
an ill-advised price war between competing producers. 
This same philosophy underlies the cases elsewhere in the 
country where statutes fixing minimum prices have been held 
constitutional, viz., protection to the public from the evils 
of low· grade and unsafe goods or service resulting from 
price wars, particularly where the merchandize or servic.e is a 
public necessity. 
One searches the title of the Chapter 342 of the Acts of 
1932 in vain to ascertain that three existed in the transporta-
tion industry any ill-advised competition or dangers to the 
public. To the contrary it is quite clear that the whole pur-
pose of the chapter was to regulate registration, licensing 
and operation of motor vehicles in genera.I on the highway. 
It was the adoption of a :Motor Vehicle Code by repealing 
existing scattered statutory regulations and rewriting the 
same into one enactment. 
The insertion into this Motor Vehicle Code by a Conference 
Committee of a totally foreign amendment constitutes a 
further enigma when one contemplates the fact that the 
General Assembly of 1932 enacted two other major pieces 
of legislation dealing with motor vehicles-both of these 
dealing solely with motor carriers. (1) Chapter 359 of Acts 
of 1932 to define motor vehicle carriers and to provide for 
the regulation of those used as co1nmon carriers and their 
rates; (2) Chapter 360 requiring common carriers by motor 
vehicle to obtain registration plates and pay certain fees and 
taxes. If there was any unsettling factor in the motor trans-
portation industry arising from the operation of motor ve-
hicles not engaged as common carriers, or by "privately 
employed'' vehicles as they were then designated ( the '' con-
tract carrier" of today), the General Assembly certainly 
would have provided in detail for their rate regulation by 
State Corporation Commission in Chapter 359 in-
page 28 ~ stead of by an isolated paragraph not germane 
to Chapter 342. 
Again, let it be said there is nothing apparent in the 
titles, preambles or content of any of the 1932 legislation 
from whic.h a Court may determine as was done in Reynolds 
v. Milk Comm..ission., supra, that any condition existing 
which warranted legislation fixing "minim'U'm" rates of any 
20 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
carriers, common or otherwise. To adopt a phrase used by 
the plaintiff, ''the statute is an inexplicable accident having 
no meaning whatever and representing no considered legisla-
tive intent whatever.'' 
If it did have any purported meaning it was effectively 
negated in 1936 when the General Assembly amended the 
Motor Carriers Act to provide that the Corporation Commis-
sion shall have no power to regulate or control the rates 
or charges of contract carriers . 
• • • • • 
Furthermore-no conditions are shown to exist in the 
transportation industry today which parallel the findings 
made in Reynolds Y. Milk Commission, supra, which would 
justify the constitutional enforcement of any legislation fixing 
"minimimi" rates of contract carriers. 
There are at least two good reasons for this. First : 
Section 56-289 of the Code of Virginia prohibits a contract 
carrier from transporting on any one motor vehicle the 
property of more than two consignors at the same time. This 
provision has been in the law since 1936 and its limitation 
has kept a contract carrier truly a private business and out 
of the realm of the common carrier industry. 8 econd: An 
able and alert Corporation Commission has kept its finger 
constantly upon the pulse of the transportation industry, and 
from time to time in that part of its jurisdiction devoted to 
· the administrative function it has supported any 
page 29 ~ legislation needed to stabilize the industry or pro-
tect the public . 
• • • • • 
Regulation of a business or activity, including regulation· 
of rates, must be promulgated pursuant to the police power 
to be constitutional, otherwise it is violative of Article I, 
Section 1 of the Virginia Bill of Rights. See Moore v. Sut-
ton, 185 Va. 481, where the Court held unconstitutional an act 
to regulate the trade of photographers, and said in part: 
'' This so-called police power is an elastic power, but falls 
far short of being a limitless power. It ends where the rea-
sonable necessity for legislation to protect the morals, health, 
safety and general welfare of the public ·ends. It extends 
no further. Any effort to extend it is violative of the con-
stitutional rights of the citizen. 
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• • • • • 
''We do not think the business or trade, and its incidents, 
and those who practice it, and who are sought to be protected 
by the act, furnish any justification for invoking such (police) 
power. 
"It does not appear that the public health, the public 
safety, the public morals or any public interest, is so inter-
woven with or affected by the occupation of photography 
as to furnish any rational basis urging that, under any 
conception of the police power, the legislature may lift an 
ordinary calling or business out of its natural channel and 
setting and clothe it with a public welfare vesture, so as to 
render nugatory a solemn constitutional inhibition.'' (Italics 
supplied.) 
While the analogy between the business of the contract 
motor vehicle carrier and that of photography may not be 
too close, the principles announced in the foregoing comments 
of the Court of Appeals apply to all private enterprise until 
it becomes '' affected with a public interest or clothed with a 
public use.'' Reynolds v. Milk Commission, supra. 
page 30 ~ It is important to observe, as the Court re-
marked in Moore v. Sutton, that regulation merely 
to protect those who are engaged in the industry as com-
petitors, is not a valid excuse for e~ercise of the police power. 
The ultimate protection must be for the public, and until 
conditions in the particular industry are such that the public 
weal is endangered unless competitors are protected by 
regulations, the police power may not be interposed. 
As has been observed earlier, no recognizable legitimate 
legislative intent is discernible in the 1932 enactment of what 
is now Section 46-2 of the Code. Considering the fact that a 
growing motor carrier industry was emerging on the trans-
portation scene; that the only common carrier by land whose 
rates were ''fixed'' by the State Corporation Commission 
was that by rail; that the statute referred to a rate less 
than that ''fixed'' by the Commission for '' a common car-
rier"; that the "l'ord "territory," peculiar to railroad rate 
making, was employed; it is not too speculative to surmise 
that the purpose of this non-germane Conference Committee 
amendment was to protect the railroad transportation in-
dustry from the inroads of a growing motor vehicle carrier 
industry. If that was the purpose, and as already observed 
no public purpose is evident, then the enactment is uncon-
stitutional. 
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Furthermore, to limit a contract carrier in the number of 
consignors for whom he may carry on any given trip while 
permitting him to make the trip at his own schedule, thus 
altering two important factors present in ascertaining rates 
to which common carriers may charge, and then prescribe its 
rates in terms of those prescribed for common carriers, may 
indeed run afoul of the constitutional prohibition against un-
reasonableness and discrimination. 
page 31 ~ CONCLUSION. 
Non-regulation of the b1rniness enterprise is the philosophy 
presumed under our Constitution unless and until such regu-
lation becomes necessary in the pu hlic interest. Therefore 
any attempt at regulation is to be view·ed with caution. 
As to regulation of maximum rates chargeable by a busi-
ness, still further caution is to be exercised. 
As to regulation of minimum rates chargeable, the maxi-
mum caution should be exercised, and chaotic conditiorn;; in 
the industry must exist to justify this drastic exeeption to the 
system of free enterprise. 
For the reasons heretofore expressed tlw Court is of 
opinion that Section 46-2 of the Code as applied to a con-
tract carrier by motor vehicle 1) is unconstitutional because 
it is an unwarranted exercise of the police power to regulate 
a private business not affected with a publie interest; and 
(2) is unenforceable because so vague, indefinite and uncer-
tain as to make its application impossible; and (3) has 
been repealed by implication by the 1936 enactment o:f 
Section 56-276 of the Code. 
Wherefore the Court is of the further opinion that the 
defendant is not required by law to charge any specified 
minimum rate for its services as a contract carrier and there-
fore is contractually obligated, pursuant to its contract of 
October 15, 1956, to transport for the plaintiff at the contract 
rate of Twenty-Two Cents (22c) per one hundred (100) 
pounds. 
June 10, 1957. 
page 32 ~ 
• 
Filed June 28, 1957. 
• • 
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Teste: 
CHAS. R. PURDY, Clerk 
By LOUISE C .. FIELD, D. C. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL AND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
The defendant makes the following assignments of error: 
(1) The court erred in declaring that § 46-2 of the Code 
of Virginia is unenforceable as against contract motor 
carriers. 
(2) The court erred in declaring that the defendant is 
not required by law to charge any specified minimum rate 
for its services as a contract motor vehicle carrier. 
(3) The court ,erred in its adjudication, its order, and its 
decree that the defendant is contractually obli-
page 33 ~ gated pursuant to its contract of October 15, 1956,. 
to transport for the plaintiff, in accordance with 
the other provisions of the said contract, at such contract 
rate of 22 cents per 100 pounds. 
Respectfully, 
MUNDY MOTOR LINES 
By Counsel. 
WOODS, ROGERS, MUSE & WALKER 
301-319 Boxley Building 
Roanoke, Virginia . 
• • 
Filed April 29, 1957. 
Teste: 
• • • 
CHAS. R. PURDY, Clerk 
By LOUISE C. FIELD, D. C. 
EXHIBIT. 
STIPULATION OF RECORD. 
April 19, 1957. 
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It is formally stipulated between the parties, by counsel, 
that the following is admitted as relevant and material evi-
dence in this proceeding: 
1. That the Virginia Code Commission of Virginia has 
determined to recommend to the 1958 General Assembly of 
Virginia that Section 46-2 be deleted from the Code of 
Virginia, 1950, and that its recommendation will be in sub-
stantially the following words : 
" ( 46-2) 
Deleted. 
Note: This section permits the Corporation Commission 
to set a minimum rate for contract carriers. The section is 
thus in conflict with § 56-276 which prohibits the Corpora-
tion Commission from controlling the rates and charges of 
contract carriers. Although Overnite Transporta.tion Co. v. 
Woodfin, 196 Va. 747 (1955) held that 46-2 could be enforced 
in a common carriers suit for an injunction, the validity 
of the section was not in issue in that case and tlie section 
has not been enforced administratively. It is believed that 
the policy stated in § 56-276 is the desirable one and that 
46-2 should be repealed. It would be extremely difficult for 
the contract carrier to maintain records of his operations and 
extremely expensive and cumbersome for the Corporation 
Commission to enforce such requirements. The Corpora-
tion .Commission recommends deletion of tlle section.'' 
2. That, in response to the request of T. lv[unford Boyd, of 
counsel for the Code Commission, for comment con-
page 2 ~ cerning Section 46-2, Code of Virg-inia, 1950, Ralph 
T. Catterall, Commissioner, State Corporation Com-
mission of Virginia, addressed to Mr. Boyd the following 
communication under date of November 9, 1956: 
''COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION 
RICH:MOND. 
Professor T. Munford Boyd 
University of Virginia Law School 
Charlottesville, Virginia. 
November 9, 1956. 
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. Dear Munny: 
I think the law declared by § 46-2 is wrong in principle 
in that it purports to fix the rates to be charged by a contract 
carrier. 
A contract carrier is called a contract carrier because he 
makes contracts concerning his rates and services instead of 
being bound by state-made regulations. 
A contract carrier is not a public service company. He 
receives no special privilege from· the state. He has no 
monopoly rights and no protection of any kind from competi-
tion. The business is open to every man who owns a truck. 
The filed rates of common carriers are necessarily extra-
ordinarily complicated. It takes a traffic expert to under-
stand them. The small contract carrier could not ascertain 
the legal rate ev:en if his life depended on it. He ought not 
to be punished for his failure to ascertain the proper rate. 
In order to enforce this law, it would be necessary to 
employ experts to audit the books of contract carriers to find 
out what rates they charged. Thousands of little truckers do 
not keep books and could not keep them if they had to. 
It would be hard to sustain the constitutionality of a law 
requiring a carrier who does not hold himself out to serve the 
public to charge rates fixed by law. In what way is the 
public interest involved? Is there any reason for fixing the 
price of this service that would not apply to fixing the price 
of hair-cuts¥ 
Section 46-2 cannot be enforced except in the most sporadic 
fashion and ought, in my opinion to be repealed. 
page 3 ~ If some legislation is needed it ought to be studied 
carefully, because the problem affects both kinds 
of carriers. A common carrier can also operate as a contract 
carrier. Most of them do operate as contract carriers when 
they are hauling truckload freight for a single consignor. 
This means that, to a large extent, the rates for truckload 
freight are not subject to S. C. C. regulation. Before making 
a drastic change in the present pattern of regulation, the 
industry ought to be consulted. So far as I know, the industry 
is serving the public well under the present system, and you 
don't want regulation merely for the sake of regulation. 
This problem also involves the purely private carriers who 
are not subject to any regulation. I do not think it helps the 
public in the long run to make for-hire transportation so 
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complicated that more and more stores and factories turn to 




3. The correspondence between Henry E. Ketner, of coun-
sel for the plaintiff, and ·wmiam C. Seibert, Commerce 
Counsel, State Corporation Commission of Virginia, consist-
ing of six letters, three from Ketner to .Seibert, dated March 
26, 1957, and three from Seibert to Ketner, dated March 27, 
1956, in reply thereto, as follows: 
' 'Law Offices 
HENRY E. KETNER 
State Planters Bank Building 
Richmond 19, Virginia. 
March 26, 1957. 
Mr. William C. Seibert, Commerce Counsel 
State Corporation Commission 
Richmond, Virginia . 
Dear Sir: 
Section 56-318 of the Code of Virginia, 1950, provides that 
no change shall be made in any rate, fare, charge, etc., in any 
effective tariff of a common carrier by motor vehicle except 
after thirty days notice of the proposed change posted in 
accordance with Section 56-316. 
As I understand it, under this Section and other applicable 
Sections of the statute, rates and charges of motor 
page 4 ~ vehicle common carriers may not generally speak-
ing be increased without securing the specific au-
thority from the Commission. It is also my understanding 
that a common carrier by motor vehicle intrastate in Virginia 
may reduce its rates and charges without the necessity of a 
hearing before the Commission or showing cause as to why 
such rates should be reduced. The general practice being 
that motor vehicle common carriers may reduce their rates, 
more or less, at will, without specific authority from the 
Commission. 
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I shall appreciate if you will advise me in this connection. 
Yours very truly, 
HENRY E. KETNER. 
HEK:vs'' 
''COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION 
Mr. Henry E. Ketner 
State-Planters Bank Building 
Richmond 19, "Virginia. 
Dear Mr. Ketner: 
March 27, 1957. 
This is in reference to your letter of March 26 with respect 
to the filing of tariffs with the State Corporation Commission 
by common carriers by motor vehicle. 
Section 56-318 of the "Virginia Code is a part of the "Vir-
ginia Motor Carrier Act. The "Virginia Motor Carrier Act 
was patterned after Interstate Commerce Act, Part 2, and 
much of the language in the "Virginia Act is the same as that 
.in the Interstate Act. 
Section 56-318 provides for a thirty (30) days' notice of any 
proposed change, whether an increase or a decrease, unless 
the Commission allows the change on less than the normal 
filing period. A common carrier by motor vehicle may either 
increase or reduce its rates without a hearing before the 
Commission upon the proper filing of the tariff. In neither 
case is the authority of the Commission required. Usually 
however, an increase in rates or charges results in objections 
being expressed to the Commission and in the event the in-
creased rates are sometime suspended whereas in the case 
of reduction it is not the normal practice for a.nyone to object 
to a reduction. 
WCS:awd 
Yours very truly, 
WILLIAM C. SEIBERT 
Commerce Counsel.'' 
Supre~e Court of Appeals of Virginia 
''LAW OFFICES 
HENRY E. KETNER 
State Planters Bank Building 
Richmond 19, Virginia. 
March 26, 1957. 
Mr .. William C. Seibert, Commerce Counsel 
State Corporation Commission 
Richmond, Virginia. 
Dear Sir: 
. As you know, rail rates have been and a.re fixed or estab-
lished by territories, such as official territory and southern 
territory. Intrastate in Virginia, for example, it has been 
the practice of the railroads to establish rates in what is 
known as the official territory portion of the state, and 
generally a different level of rates between points in the 
southern territory portion of the State. In fact, in Case 
3102 the State Corporation Commission prescribed rates for 
application in official territory and a different level of rates 
for application in southern territory, and still a different level 
for application interterritorially lJetween the two territories. 
On the other hand, it is my understanding that rates for 
motor vehicle common carriers are not so fixed or established, 
that is by territories, hut are published and established on a 
point to point basis, even though most of such rates are 
published in one agency tariff. 
I shall appreciate if you will be good enough to advise 
me if rates for motor vehicle common carriers intrastate in 
Virginia are published or established on a territorial basis, · 
or on a point to point basis. In other words, what is the 
distinction between the method of publishing and establishing 
-rail rates vs. publishing or establishing motor vehicle com-
mon carrier rates Y 
Yours very· truly, 
HENRY E. KETNER . 
."HEK:vs'' 
·page 6 ~ ''COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
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Mr. Henry E. Ketner 
State-Planters Bank Building 
Richmond 19, Virginia. 
Dear Mr. Ketner: 
March 27, 1957. 
I have your letter of March 26 concerning the differences 
in rail rates and motor carrier rates. 
It is true that Virginia in the past has been divided into 
two different territories in connection with railroad rates. 
The large part of Virginia has been in official or eastern ter-
ritory. That small pa.rt of Virginia generally south of the 
Virginian Railway has been in southern territory. The rates 
in official territory were generally the result of the decision 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission in Interstate Com-
merce Commission's Docket 15879 and in the southern terri-
tory as a result of Interstate Commerce Commission's Docket 
13494. Case 3102 which was a proceeding of investigation of 
railroad rates and classifications in Virginia followed to a 
large measure the application of the two different territorial 
rates and adopted the official and southern classifications in 
place of the old Virginia classification. Case 3102 was in-
stituted by order of this Commission of January 24, 1927. 
Recent decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 
Docket 28300 have changed to some extent the differences 
in the two territories, howev·er, in the emergency increases 
permitted by the Interstate Commerce Commission on inter-
state traffic in Ex Pa.rte 206, a different measure of increase 
was made for eastern or official territory. Railroad rates 
in Virginia may not be increased without the authority. of 
the State Corporation Commission and then on not less than 
ten (10) days' notice (Section 56-100 of the Code). 
At the time of the investigation of rail rates in Case 3102, 
the question of competition by motor traffic was not of. any 
consequence. As the motor carriers came into existence as a 
measure of competition, they adopted in many cases the rail 
rates between the points which the motor carrier served, 
and this method of rates reflected the differences in the terri-
tories. As the motor carrier industry became more healthy 
and active, it began adoptin~ rates of its own. There has not 
been any general investigation of motor carrier rates similar 
to the investigation of rail rates in Case 3102. The motor 
carriers have, from time to time, sought to change and in-
crease rates and in those instances have come before the 
30 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Commission and obtained the approval of the Commission. 
The present general applicable tariff is on a one scale basis 
and publication for most of the carriers is by an agent ap-
pointed by such carriers. 
page 7 ~ The rates of motor carriers may be changed on 
thirty (30) days' publication or notice either for an 
increase or a reduction unless authority is given for publica-
tion on less notice. The rail rates, as stated above, may only 
be increased by authority of the Commission. The statute is 
silent with respect to reduction, but the Commission has 
usually required three (3) days' notice in publication of re-
duced rail rates. 
WCS:awd" 
Yours very truly, 
WILLIAM C. SEIBERT 
Commerce Counsel. 
''Law Offices 
HENRY E. KETNER 
State Planters Bank Building 
Richmond 19, Virginia. 
March 26, 1957. 
Mr. ·wmiam C. Seibert, Commerce Counsel 
State Corporation Commission 
Richmond, Virginia. 
Dear Sir: 
I invite your attention to the decision of tlrn Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals in 1.11 athieson Alkali Works v. Nor-
folk and Western Railwav, 137 S. E. 608, wherein the court 
stated that rail rates as published in Virginia on intrastate 
traffic are what is known as '' Commission made'' rates. I 
also invite your attention to the decision and order of the 
State Corporation Commission in Case No. 3102, wherein 
the Commission, after a state wide investigation and several 
hearings, fixed or prescribed rail rates for application intra-
state in Virginia. 
My question is, has the Commission fixed or prescribed 
the: rates for motor vehicle common carriers intrastate in 
yirginia f I think . .tli,er~ is little doubt that tl1e Commission 
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has fixed or prescribed rail rates intrastate in Virginia, but I 
know of no action taken by the Commission to indicate that 
the Commission has fixed or prescribed motor vehiele common 
carrier rates in Virginia. 
In this connection I invite your attention to Section 12-54 of 
the 1950 Code of Virginia which provides in detail the steps 
which the Commission shall follow in prescribing- or fixing 
any rate or rates for application in Virginia. I think the 
Commission has followed the provisions of this Section in 
connection with the establishment of rail rates 
page 8 ~ in Virginia, bnt I know of no action taken by the 
Commission that could lJe considered ns fixin~ or 
prescribing motor vehicle common carrier rates in Virginia, 
pursuant to Section 12-54 of the Code, or any other provisions 
of the statute. It is true, of course, that motor vehicle 
common carriers file their ta.riffs with the Commission n.nd 
if and when the Commission accepts such tariffs for filing 
the rates shown therein may be considered the lawful rates, 
but they are not rates which were actually fixed or prescribed 
by the Commission. Also, in revenue cases wherein the motor 
vehicle common carriers seek the Commission's authority for 
increasing their rates intrastate in Virginia, the Commission 
has in a. number of instances granted such authority, but 
such action by the Commission could not be considered by 
the Commission as fixing or prescribing rates. 
I shall appreciate your advice at your earliest convenience. 
Yours very truly, 
HENRY E. KETNER.'' 
HEK:vs 
''COMMONvVEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION 
Mr. Henry E. Ketner 
State-Planters Bank Building 
Richmond 19, Virginia. 
Dear Mr. Ketner: 
March 27, 1957. 
This is in reference to your letter of March 26 asking a 
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question as to: fixed or prescribed rates of motor carriers in 
Virginia and referring to the Mathieson case. 
I have written you another letter today which I believe will 
answer this letter. If it does not, please give me the question 
ag~in and I wil~ be glad to ans~er. 
Yours very. truly, 
WCS:awd'' 
· "WILLIAM C. SEIBERT 
Commerce Counsel. 
page 9 ~ 4. ( 1) That the records of the Corporation Com-
mission disclose that on April 18, 1957, there were 
39 common carriers of property by motor vehicle of all types, 
of which 28 were also contract carriers by motor vehicle; 
that there were approximately 4,000 contract carriers by 
motor vehicle, a large majority of which were single truck 
operators. 
(2) That, prior to 1928, the control of for-hire carriers by 
motor vehicle was exercised by the State Corporation Com-
mission of Virg-inia; that from 1928 to 1932, the Motor Ve-
hicle Commissioner and the State Corporation Commission 
of Virginia exercised to!?;ether a sort of joint control over 
motor vehicle carriers; that the contract carrier as such was 
not known until the adoption of the Virginia Motor Vehicle 
Carrier Act of 1936; that under present law· the Director 
of the Division of Motor Vehicles in fact exercises no au-
thority whatever over carriers by motor vehicle except to 
issue truck license plates and to make inspections for safety; 
that the State Corporation Commission of Virginia now 
exercises authority over common carriers by the issuance of a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity, and over con-
tract carriers by the issuance of a permit; that for each ve-
hicle operating, whether as common or contract carrier, 
the State Corporation Commission of Virginia issues annually 
a warrant and a classification plate that indicate the author-
ity under w·hich each vehicle operates. 
April 19, 1957. 
. AUBREY R. BffWLES, JR. 
of Counsel for Plaintiff . 
. LEONARD G. MUSE 
Attorney for Defendant. 
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Vol.· I.. . 
_ Virginia: 
In the Hustings Court of the City of R~chmond P~rt T;o. 
E. I. duPont de Nemours & Company, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Mundy Motor Lines, Defendant. 
DEPOSITION. 
The deposition of Charles L. Appenzeller taken, pursuant to 
the annexed notice, before C. L. Craig, a Notary Public, at the 
offices of Messrs. Bowles, Anderson & Boyd, 901 Mutual 
Building, 909 East Main Street, Richmond, Virginia, between 
the hours of two p. m., and five p. m., of the 5th day of 
April, 1957, to be read as evidence on behalf of the plaintiff 
in the above-entitled cause, pending in said court. 
Appearances: Messrs. Bowles, Anderson & Boyd, by 
Aubrey R. Bowles, Jr., Esq., and Jack N. Herod, Esq., and 
Henry E. Ketner, Esq., of Richmond; and Carl E. Geuther, 
Esq., of Wilmington, Del.; Attorneys for the Plaintiff. 
Vol. I. 
page 2 ~ Mr. Bowles: For the record, I would like to 
state that this morning prior to the commencement of this 
deposition pursuant to the notice delivered to the Notary 
Public, Mr. Leonard G. Muse, attorney for the defendant, 
called me by telephone and said that Roanoke Airport was 
closed in and had been closed in since yesterday and would 
be closed in through the remainder of this day; that Mr. 
Muse was prepared to drive to Richmond in order to attend 
the deposition at two o-'clock if his presence were demanded 
by the plaintiff, but that it was raining torrents in Roanoke 
and that he would prefer not to do so and suggested that he 
would not attend the deposition if it could be agreed that a 
copy of it would be furnished· to him promptly and the right 
reserved -to him to recall Mr. Charles L. Appenzeller, or any 
other witness whose testimony was taken on this day, at a 
subsequent time for · cross examination; and, the plaintiff 
agreeing to this condition, ·it -was understood that Mr. Muse 
would not attend. 
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Vol. I. 
page 3 ~ CHARLES L. APPENZELLER, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the plaintiff 
and being first duly sworn, deposed as follows : 
DIRECT· EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Bowles: · 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, please state your name and residence. 
A. Charles L. Appenzeller, 903 West 22nd Street, Wilming-
ton, Delaware. 
Q. What is your occupation? 
A. I am Assistant Traffic Manager of the E. I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Companv, Wilmington, Delaware. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, ";ill you tell us, please, your experience 
and qualifications in connection with the matters that we 
have under consideration today? 
A. I have been employed in the du Pont Traffic Depart-
ment for the past twenty-one years. Originally I was em-
ployed as a rate clerk in our Rate Division a.nd, after several 
years at that work, was appointed Traffic Supervisor of 
the Morgantown Ordnance "\Yorks, Morgantown, w· est Vir-
ginia. This plant was built by the duPont Company for the 
U. S. Government for the manufacture of an hydrous am-
monia. After four years at this location, I was appointed 
Traffic Supervisor at another plant being built by 
Vol. I. du Pont Company for the U. S. Government at 
page 4 ~ Charlestown, Indiana. After a year at this location, 
I returned to our "\Vilmington Office and spent the 
next year in our Rate Division. On January 1, 1947, I was 
appointed Manager of our Trucking Division, and on October 
1, 1950, was appointed Assistant Traffic Manager. 
Q. Mr . .Appenzeller, have you undertaken any special 
studies in connection with rate making or traffic management 1 
A. During my early appointment in the du Pont Traffic 
Department, I attended Fenn College, at Cleveland, Ohio, and 
took a year's course in traffic management. 
Q. Would you explain in some detail what your duties are 
as Assistant Traffic Manager of du Pont 1 
A. As Assistant Traffic Manager, I am responsible for all 
traffic matters pertainin~ to our Textile Fibres Department, 
Film Department, and Old Hickory Chemical Company, which 
is a subsidiary. All traffic matters involving these plants 
throughout the United States are under my jurisdiction and 
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supervision. One of my principal duties is to enter into 
negotiations with common and contract carriers for rates 
and services for the various products shipped from those 
plants. 
Q. Do you keep in constant and daily touch with the tariffs 
or supplements published and filed with the regu-
Vol. I. latory authorities by the various "for hire" car-
page 5 ~ riers, such as railroads, Railway Express Company, 
motor vehicle carriers, water lines, air lines, and 
freight forwarders 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you state whether or not you are familiar with 
the tariffs and supplements filed by the various common 
carriers with the State Corporation Commission of Virginia, 
Interstate Commerce Commission, and other regulatory 
bodies! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you prepared rate and tariff testimony and pre-
sented same as a witness before the carriers' associations and 
various regulatory bodies during your employment with du 
Pont? 
A. Yes, I have prepared rate and ta riff testimony and 
presented same as a witness before the Interstate Commerce 
Commission as well as various rail and motor carrier rate 
and classification committees. 
Q. Are you familiar with the issues involved in this pro-
ceeding being heard today? 
A. Yes; this proceeding concerns the proper freight rate 
to apply for the truckload movement of synthetic fibre yarn 
via Mundy Motor LineR, a. rontract carrier, between Martins-
ville and Roanoke, Virginia. We had negotiated 
Vol. I. a. contract with l\Iuncly for a rate of 22c per cwt., 
page 6 ~ minimum 2f>,000 lbs. On December 13, 1956, we 
were notified by Mundy that they were concerned 
with the possibility of criminal prosecution unrler Section 
46-18 of the Virginia Code, if the 22c rate specified in our 
contract was in violation of the provisions of Section 46-2. 
Mundy advised that unless we were prepared to pay a com-
mon carrier rate of 38c per cwt., minimum 20,000 lbs., with 
respect to all future shipments, he would not perform any of 
the obligations imposed under our contract. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, yon have referred to a neg·otiated con-
tract with Mundy :Motor Lines. I hand you herewith copy 
of an agreement which is marked as Exhibit A with ·the peti-
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tion for declaratory judgment filed in this matter and ask you 
whether that is an accurate copy of the contract to which you· 
ref er, and request that, if so, you file it as an exhibit with 
your testimony. 
A. It is. Q. Will you file that, please, as Exhibit A with your testi-
mony! 
· (Exhibit A with the petition for declaratory judgment is 
herewith incorporated as Exhibit A to the testimony of this 
witness.) 
Q. I hand you, likewise, Mr. Appenzeller, a photostatic 
copy of a letter dated December 13, 1956, consisting 
Vol. I. of two pages, addressed to Mr. Paul J. Keehan, 
page 7 ~ Manager, Trucking Division, E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Company, Wilmington, Delaware, and 
signed by Mundy Motor Lines, by Gardner A. Mundy, Presi-
dent, which copy is attached as Exhibit B to the petition for 
declaratory judgment, and ask you whether that is an accurate 
copy of the letter addressed to Mr. Keehan 7 
A. It is. 
Q. Will you file that as Exhibit B with your testimony? 
(Exhibit B with the petition for declaratory judgment is 
herewith incorporated as Exhibit B to the testimony of this 
witness.) 
Q. I hand you now, Mr. Appenzeller, a photostatic copy 
of a letter dated December 17, 1956, from Mr. Paul J. Keehan, 
Manager of the Trucking Division of the plaintiff, addressed 
to Mr. Gardner A. Mundy, President, Mundy Motor Lines, 
Roanoke, Virginia, which is marked as Exhibit C with the 
petition for declaratory judgment, and ask you if it is an 
accurate copy of the letter written by Mr. Keehan T 
A. It is. 
Q. Will you file that, please, as Exhibit C with your testi-
mony? 
Vol. I. (Exhibit C with the petition for declaratory judg-
page 8 ~ ment is herewith incorporated as Exhibit C to the 
testimony of this witness.) 
Q. Who is Mr. Keehan? 
A. Mr. Keehan is the present Manager of our Trucking 
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Division. He is responsible for making the necessary ar-
rangements for service, but has no jurisdiction over rate 
matters. 
Q. Is he the appropriate person to whom any correspond~ 
ence relating to that contract would be addressed at du 
PonU 
A. Yes, he is, because he is responsible for making ar-
rangements for this type of service. 
Q. Now, Mr. Appenzeller, this contract that you have filed 
as Exhibit A was a contract between du Pont and Mundy 
Motor Lines for transportation of synthetic fibre yarn from 
Martinsville, Virginia, to Roanoke, Virginia; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was the du Pont Company the only consignor contem-
plated in that contract 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the Mundy Motor Lines is the only hauler con-
templated in the contract? 
A. That is correct. 
Vol. I. 
page 9 ~ Q. Mr. Appenzeller, that means that there is one 
shipper involved, one hauler involved, and the rate 
covers the hauling of this particular commodity between 
Martinsville and Roanoke in both directions? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, is there actually a movement of this 
commodity in both directions between those points pursuant 
to this contract? 
A. Yes, truckload shipments have been made in both direc-
tions. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, have you prepared a series of exhibits 
for submission in this case dealing with the freight rates 
intrastate in Virginia, applicable via the various common 
carriers covering the movement of synthetic fibre yarn and 
other commodities from and to various points in Virginia! 
A. Yes. 
Q. I hand you herewith a series of exhibits marked Ex-
hibits 1 through 26, inclusive, and ask you whether or not 
these are the exhibits to which you have just referred f 
A. They are. 
Q. Will you please file those as exhibits 1 through 26, re-
spectively, with your testimony? 
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Vol. I. (The exhibits referred to, numbered 1 through 
page 10 ~ 26, respectively, were filed with the original of this 
deposition.) 
Q. Are these exhibits accurate as reflecting the information 
set forth thereon? 
A. They are. 
Q. ,vere these exhibits prepared by you or under your 
direct supervision with the assistance of people in your 
department 1 
A. These exhibits were prepared by our Rate Division 
under my supervision. 
Q. Now, tell me, please, are they representative of the 
general condition in the State of Virginia. with regard to the 
information shown thereon, or have they been carefully hand-
picked to establish a preconceived notion of that general 
situation? 
A. In my opinion, they are representative of the rate8 
published and in effect today on the shipments moving in 
Virginia intrastate traffic. No effort was made to single out 
particular rates but, instead, we have attempted to show the 
general level of rates on various commodities. 
Q. Have you undertaken to pick illustrative conditions im-
partially with respect to the controversy here in-
Vol. I. involved! 
page 11 ~ A. All of the rates shown were impartially se-
lected. 
Q. You have included in these exhibits rates with respect 
to similar commodities, with no restriction to du Pont com-
modities alone; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. ·which one of your exhibits deals specifically with tl.e 
rates on synthetic fibre yarn between Martinsville and Roa-
noke, Virginia? · 
A. Exhibit No. 1. 
Q. ·wm you please look at Exhibit No. 1, and I direct your 
attention thereon to the various headings, Commodity, From, 
To, Truck Miles, Truck Rate, and so forth. ,v ould you 
undertake, as a preliminary to a discussion of that exhibit, 
to explain the designations and the mechanical set-up of 
the exhibit, please? · 
A. Exhibit No. 1 is entitled '' Exhibit Showing Common 
Carrier Truck v. Common Carrier Rail v. Contract Carrier 
Truck Rates on Synthetic Fibre Yarn Between Martinsville, 
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Va., and Roanoke, Va.'' On the left side of the exhibit I 
show the commodity, which is synthetic fibre yarn, from 
Martinsville to Roanoke, Virginia, and from Roanoke, Vir-
ginia, to Martinsville, Virginia. After this information, the 
common carrier truck rates are shown, as well as 
Vol. I. the truck mileage. The rates on this ex]1ibit, as 
page 12 ~ well as other exhibits, are shown in cents per 
cwt. with the corresponding minimum weight with 
which the rate is published. In addition to the rates and 
minimum weights, the basis on which the rates are established 
is also indicated. Class rates are identified by the abbrevia-
tion ''Class.'' and commodity rates are identified with the 
abbreviation ''Comm.'' In addition, the appliable first class 
rate is shown, as well as the percentage which the applicable 
rate reflects of the first class rate in effect between Martins-
ville and Roanoke, Virginia. 
Q. Let me interrupt you, Mr. Appenzeller. The column 
''Minimum'' is expressed in lbs., is it not? 
A. Yes, sir; that is correct. 
Q. Go ahead, sir. 
A. The truck authority for each common carrier truck rate 
is indicated on this particular exhibit with the reference mark 
"(1)" or" (2)." 
Q. Is the same true with respect to common carrier rail 
rates t Is the same system used Y 
A. Yes, sir, the same method. 
Q. I notice that you have numerous abbreviations, and I 
understand that you have compiled an explanation of the 
abbreviations used in these exhibits, 1 throug·h 26; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Vol. I. 
p~ge 13 ~ Q. V.l ould you hand to the Stenographer, so that 
he can file them, a list showing the explanation of 
the abbreviations used? 
A. I will. 
Q. I ask you to incorporate those in your testimony, and 
request that the Stenographer type that explanation on the 
front of Exhibit No. 1 for ready reference. 
(The list entitled "Explanation of Abbreviations Used in 
Exhibits'' was attached to Exhibit No. 1 accompanying the 
original of this deposition.) 
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Q. Now, Mr. Appenzeller, I call your attention to Exhibit 
No. 1. At the bottom you have shown Truck Authority: (1), 
(2), and (3), and Rail Authority: ( 4), (5), and (6), and you· 
have certain abbreviations in those. "VCC," I take it, 
means Virginia Corporation Commission? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And ''ICC'' means Interstate Commerce Commission? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is th~ reference, I take it, to the authority for the 
information contained on that exhibit in the respective re-
ferences! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Vol. I. 
page 14 r Q. The references that you have made are to 
tariffs on file with those respective authorities; is 
that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And you have, in the preparation of this exhibit, 
examined those tariffs so filed, from which all these exhibits 
were made up 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, will you explain now Exhibit No. 17 
A. Exhibit No. 1 shows two sets of common carrier rates 
between Martinsville and Roanoke on synthetic fibre yarn and 
also the contract carrier truck rate on synthetic fibre yarn via 
Mundy Motor Lines between the same points. The common 
carrier truck rates from Martinsville to Roanoke range from 
38c per cwt .to 96c per cwt., depending upon the weight of 
the individual shipment, a.nd in the reverse direction, that 
is, from Roanoke to Martinsville, the common carrier truck 
rates range from 22c per cwt. to 68c per cwt., depending upon 
the weight of the individual shipments. 
It will be noted in this connection that there is no common 
carrier motor vehicle rate published by the common ea.rrier 
truck lines which carries a minimum of 25,000 
Vol. I. pounds, as does the contract rate of 22c maintained 
page 15 r by Mundy Motor Lines between Martinsville and 
Roanoke. This exhibit also shows the common 
carrier rail rates between Martinsville and Roanoke rang-e 
from 26c to 57 c per cwt., which apply in connec,tion with 
weights ranging up to 60,000 lbs. However, here again there 
is no rate provided for a minimum of 25,000 lbs. on which the 
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contract carrier rates are predicated. That exhibit· also 
shows that the rail rates are predicated on a rail distance of 
62 miles, whereas, the common carrier truck rates are pre-
dicated on a distance of 53 miles. 
Q. I observe from your Exhibit No. 1 that the rate on 
synthetic fibre yarn from Martinsville to Roanoke is 38c per 
cwt. with a truckload minimum of 20,000 lbs., whereas in the 
reverse direction, from Roanoke to Martinsville, you show 
a rate of 25c per cwt., with a truckload minimum of 23,000 
lbs., and 22c per cwt. with a truckload minimum of 30,000 
lbs. Do you have any explanation regarding this situation, 
namely, the rates being much higher in one direction than 
in the other direction between the same points? 
A. No. Of course, a rate is not complete without a specific 
minimum weight. The minimum weight is part of the rate. 
Due to the variance in the common carrier truck rates and 
minimums on the same commodity between the 
Vol. I. same points, it is inconceivable that these rates 
page 16 ~ could be considered as fixed by the Virginia State 
Commission. Actually, they were voluntarily es-
tablished by the common motor carriers, and if Section 46-2 
has application insofar as a contract rate is concerned, we 
would be at a loss to know which rate should be considered 
the common carrier rate for application as a minimum rate. 
Q. What are the principal factors to be considered in the 
fixing of just, reasonable, non-prejudicial, and non-discrimina-
tory rates for common carriers? 
A. The length of haul, the volume of movement, the value 
of the commodity, its density or weight per cubic foot, its 
susceptibility to damage, and the competition between the 
various modes of transportation. 
Q. What are the differences, if any, in contract carrier 
service and common carrier service by motor vehicle intra-
state in Virginia? 
A. A common carrier in Virginia serves the public and 
maintains generally a regular scheduled service over regular 
routes between points it serves. A contract carrier, on the 
other hand, provides service for individual shippers via ir-
regular routes and on call. 
Q. Let me interrupt you, Mr. Appenzeller. The contract 
carrier operates pursuant to a specific existing contract be-
tween specific individuals, and not on a basis of a public 
42 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
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holding-out; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·what else have you to say about that serv-
A. Also contract carriers may not haul property of more 
than two ~onsignors in one vehicle at the same time. This 
feature is covered by Section 56-289 of the Virginia Code. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, is there any tariff filed by contract 
carriers? 
A. No, sir. None is required on Virginia intrastate traffic. 
Q. There is no tariff then, on file for a contra.ct carrier to 
haul synthetic fibre yarn between Roanoke and l\fartinsville, 
Virginia? . 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Do you know whether or not these rates, that is, the 
rates on synthetic fibre yarn between Roanoke and Martins-
,,,.ille were fixed by the State Corporation Commission, or 
were the rates voluntarily established by the motor vehicle 
common carriers operating between those two points? 
A. The rates maintained by the common carriers by motor 
vehicle are voluntarily established and are not fixed or pre-
scribed by the State Corporation Commission. 
Vol. I. ·whenever we want a particular rate established in 
page 18 ~ Virginia, we make application through the ap-
propriate carriers' association, settin2; forth the 
tonnage, the nature of tlle product, its value, and density, and, 
through negotiations, arrive at our rates. These rates are 
filed with the State Corporation Commission by the carriers. 
If the State Corporation Commission fixed the rates on any 
of the commodities for common carrier motor vehicles, they 
would be uniform between the same points and places. How-
ever, the maze of common carrier rates shown in Exhibit 
No." 1 is conclusive, in my mind, that tl1e State Corporation 
Commission have not established these rates. Moreover, 
Section 12-54 of the 1950 Code of Virginia sets forth the re-
quirements and procedures to be followed when rates are to 
be fixed by the State Corporation Commission, which pro-
cedures were not followed in the publication of the common 
carrier truck rates shown in Exhibit No. 1. We are certain 
that none of the rates shown in our exhibits for application 
by common carriers by motor vehicle have been fixed or pre-
scribed by the State Corporation Commission. 
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Q. Mr. Appenzeller, you referred to Section 12-54 of the 
Code of Virginia, 1950, and the requirements and procedures 
there set out for fixing rates. I will ask you whether or 
not you have compared that section of the Code with· the 
third paragraph of Section 156 (b) of the Constitution of 
Virginia, and whether the requirements and procedures are 
substantially identical in the two? 
Vol. I. 
page 19 ~ A. I have compared them and did find them to 
be substantially identical. · 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, I am not sure that you have covered in 
detail the distinction between a class and a commoditv basis 
of rate, and request that you do so a little more fully~ at this 
time. What is the difference between a class rate and a 
commodity rate? 
A Class rates are published on all commodities between all 
points; therefore, commodities move on class rates until such 
time as the volume of the movement warrants the establish-
ment of a lower basis of rates, which is published in the form 
of a specific commodity rate for application between specific 
points. In most cases the application of commodity rates, 
which are lower than class rates, take precedence. 
Q. And would be considered as the prevailing rate? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that true with respect to motor vehicles as well as 
railroads? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I read to you Section 46-2, with which you say you are 
familiar, and it is as follows: 
''It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or 
Vol. I. corporation, after receiving a license from the 
page 20 ~ Commissioner as herein provided, to transport any 
commodity in any territory at a less frei,g-ht rate 
or charge than that fixed by the State Corporation Commis-
sion for a common carrier for the same commodity in the 
same territory.'' 
I want to ask you, sir, first, what is the license that is re-
ferred to in tliat section, if you know? 
A. It is my understanding that the purpose of the license 
is for the operation of the vehicle within the state. 
Q. I point out to you Section 46-1 of the Code of Virginia, 
1950, being the definitions of the Motor Vehicle Code, within 
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which is included Section 46-2 also, and read you as follows : 
'' Commissioner : The Commissioner of the Division. of 
Motor Vehicles of this state.'' 
Does it, then, appear that the Commissioner referred to in 
Section 46-2 is the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles Y 
A. I would understand it that way. 
Q. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles issues a motor 
vehicle tag; is that correcU 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. The person receiving a motor vehicle license 
Vol. I. tag under the language of 46-2 would be prohibited 
page 21 } from transporting freight in any territory at a less 
freight rate or charge than that fixed by the State 
Corporation Commission for a common carrier for the same 
commodity in the same territory. I ask you, sir, if you were 
to undertake to ascertain or, yourself, prescribe a rate for 
a contract carrier that would not be less than the rate fixed 
by the State Corporation Commission, if it were so fixed, for a 
common carrier for the same commodity in the same terri-
tory, and having in mind the facts shown by that Exhibit No. 
1, what would you use as a yardstick for determining such a 
rateY 
A. I wouldn't know. The Exhibit No. 1 clearly indicates 
the various rates which are applicable via common carrier 
truck and common carrier rail, and I honestly wouldn't know 
which rate to use as a basis for establishing the contract 
carrier rate. 
Q. A common carrier truck is a common carrier, is it noU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The common carrier by rail is a common carrier, is it 
notT 
A. Correct. 
Q. Which of those two common carriers would you say 
was designated or indicated by Section 46-2? 
Vol. I. 
page 22 } A. I can find no distinction made. I wouldn't 
know. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, will you take up your next exhibit, 
No. 2, and explain in some detail what it showsT 
A. My Exhibit No. 2 shows the motor common carrier less 
than truckload rates vers1,1,s rail common carrier less than 
carload rates on fabrics and cotton piece goods between Dan-
ville ~nd· Richmond, Virginia. It shows the varying common 
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carrier rates, dependent upon the volume that is. tendered for 
transportation. You will find the difference in mileage and 
the different percentage that the rates via common carrier 
truck and rail bear to their corresponding first class .rates.\· 
Q. Will you please do the same thing as to ·Exhibit No. 
31 , 
A. Exhibit No. 3 shows a comparison of the common carrier 
rates via motor vehicle as contrasted with the common car-
rier rail express rates on the same commodity from and to 
the same points. This exhibit shows that there is a distinc-
tion in the rates maintained by common carrier express and 
those of common carrier trucking companies, and when com-
bined with my Exhibit No. 2 it shows a widespread difference 
in the rates via common carriers. 
Q. I point to Exhibit No. 3, the rate for the 
Vol. I. Railway Express common carrier between Rich-
page 23 ~ mond and Danville, and Danville and Richmond, 
at $5.01; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. That is the published rate. 
Q. The truck rate, that is, the common carrier truck rate 
between Richmond and Danville for a minimum of 5,000 lbs. 
is 42c, is it not T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The Railway Express rate was for 100 lbs. and over 7 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Those two rates, then, would be comparable on the basis 
of weights and fairly comparable on the basis of distance, 
would they not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, the Railway Express Agency is a common carrier 
for the transportation of property, is it not? 
A. They are. 
Q. Have you any comment further to make on· that "~ide 
discrepancy 0i I asked you with respect to Exhibit No. 1 . 
how· you arrived at a contract carrier rate in the light of our 
discussion of Section 46-2. If you now add the third common 
carrier method of transportation, namely, Railway Express 
common carrier, in addition to the rail carrier and common 
carrier by motor vehicle, which one of these three would 
you use in the light of Section 46-2, which we 
Vol. I. discussed, as a yardstick by which to measure the 
page 24 ~ contract carrier rate for the same commodity be-
tween the same points f . . · .. 
A. · I wouldn't know which of the three sets of common 
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carrier rates shown on Exhibit 2 and 3 to use to establish a 
contract carrier rate. 
Q. Will you continue with Exhibit 4? 
A. My exhibit No. 4 shows the common carrier truck and 
common carrier rail rates on cotton linters pulp. The com-
mon carrier rail rates are lower than the common carrier 
truck rates, but with varying minimums. This exhibit indi-
cates the difference in distance via the two forms of trans-
portation, that is, rail versus motor vehicle. The difference 
reflecting a distance of 57 miles greater by rail than by 
motor vehicle, which is a primary consideration in regard 
to the level of rates maintained by the separate forms 
of transportation. 
Q. Will you comment on Exhibit No. 5, Mr. Appenzeller? 
A. Exhibit No. 5 shows the comparison of the common 
carrier truckload rates from and to the same points re-
f erred to in my Exhibit No. 4 with the common carrier Ex-
press rates. This exhibit s·hows a distinction made in com-
mon carrier truckload rates vers'Urs common carrier Express 
rates. It also shows that insofar as common car-
Vol. I. rier rates are concerned, ·they will differ as to the 
page 25 ~ method of transportation and the services and 
facilities available by the separate forms of com-
mon carrier transportation. 
Exhibit No. 6 shows the common carrier rail and truck 
rates on printing paper for application between Richmond 
and Norfolk, Virginia. It clearly indicates the various mini-
mum weights on which the common carrier rates a.re pub-
lished, with no uniformity maintained behveen the rail and 
motor carriers. You will note that the rail rates a.re generally 
uniform in their application but vary with their respective 
minimums, whereas, the common carrier truck rates vary in 
each instance, dependent upon the direction of the traffic 
and varying with the volume or minimum weights. The 
lowest rail ra.te is 20c, minimum 50,000 lbs. The lowest com-
mon carrier truck rate is 24c, minimum 30,000 lbs. Neither 
the common carriers by rail nor by motor vehicle hold 
themselves out specifically to transport a minimum of 25,000 
lbs. of printing paper at a rate provided in their tariffs 
for that quantity specifically. The lowest truckload rate 
on printing paper from Richmond to Norfolk is 24c per cwt., 
minimum 30,000 lbs., and in the reverse direction it is 39c 
with a minimum of 20,000 lbs. 
Q. Will you comment on Exhibit No. 7? 
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A. Exhibit No. 7 shows the variations in the 
Vol. I. common carrier truck rates from and to the same 
page 26 ~ points as shown in my Exhibit No. 6 on the same 
commodity and a clear distinction in the common 
carrier rail express rates ve1·su,s the common carrier truck and 
common carrier rail rates from and to the same points. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, will you continue your comments on 
these exhibits without my directing your attention to each 
oneY 
A. Exhibits No. 8 and No. 9 show the common carrier truck 
rates versus the common carrier rail rates versus the common 
carrier rail express rates on rayon tire cord yarn between 
Front Royal, Virginia, and Scottsville, Virginia. Via com-
mon carrier truck the rates ran~e from 28c to 49c per cwt. 
with varying minimums. By rail the rates range from 31c 
to 49c with minimums of 30,000 and 40,000 pounds. By 
Railway Express the rate is uniform with a minimum of 100 
lbs. These exhibits set forth the distinction in the services 
performed, that is, the rail rates bein~ predicated on the 
mileage of 168 miles, whereas, the truck mileage is only 95 
miles. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, ,vhat plants are located at Front 
Royal and Scottsville that would be likely to utilize in the 
transportation of rayon tire cord yarn between them the 
rates involved in this exhibiU 
A. I know the U. S. Rubber Company has a tire 
Vol. I. plant at Scottsville, Virginia, and I think the 
page 27 ~ American Viscose has a rayon tire cord yarn plant 
at Front Royal, Virginia. 
Q. Would you conclude from those facts that these tariffs 
that you have investigated and from which you have made 
these exhibits are not just paper rates, but are rates on file 
pursuant to which commodities are actually shipped in Vir-
ginia? 
A. I would. 
Q. Continue, please. 
A. Exhibits 10 and 11 show similar differences in common 
carrier trnek versits common carrier rail and Express rates 
on peanut stabilizer between Norfolk and Suffolk, Virginia. 
You will note that the truck rate is higher in one direction 
than in the other, whereas, the rail rates a.re uniform in both 
directions. 
Exhibits No. 12 and No. 13 show points in Virginia that 
are not served by rail -carriers. The only service available is 
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common or contract carriers by motor vehicles. In other 
words, there are many points in Virginia not served by rail-
roads or rail express companies and the rates of common 
carrier by rail or express could not form the basis under 
Section 46-2 for either common or contract carriers by 
motor vehicle. Q. Mr. Appenzeller, with reference to what you 
Vol. I. have just said,. might not that same situation be 
page 28 ~ true with respect to common carrier by motor ve-
hicle, namely, that there would be a point not 
served by a motor vehicle common carrier in Virginia? 
A. It is possible. 
Q. In that event and if that should be the case, then you 
would have no common carrier rate of any kind to relate a 
contract carrier rate to pursuant to Section 46-2; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then, if that were true and in that event, that there 
were no rail nor common carrier by motor vehicle rate to a 
given point, it would be certain that Section 46-2 conlrl not be 
applicable; isn't that correct? 
A. That would be my understanding. 
Q. Proceed, Mr. Appenzeller, with your Exhibit 14. 
A. Exhibits 14, 15, 16, and 17 show the difference in com-
mon carrier rates in less carload quantities and less truck-
load quantities, as well as rates by Rail Express maintained 
in Virginia on rayon yarn and s:vnthetic fibre yarn, ·et cetera. 
These exhibits show the variations in the common canier 
rates maintained in Virginia and the impossibility of apply-
ing the provisions of Section 46-2 for the establishment of 
contract motor carrier rates. 
Exhibits Nos. 18, 19, 20, and 21 show the variom; 
Vol. I. common carrier truckload rates, eommon carrier 
page 29 ~ rail carload rates, and common carrier Railway 
Express rates maintained from Roanoke and othe·r 
points in Virginia to various points in Virginia on rayon 
yarn and synthetic fibre yarn, et cetera. It also shows ·the 
wide variation or spread in the rates and minimums, depend-
ent upon the type of common carrier transportation used. 
Exhibits Nos. 22 and 23 show the variation in rates and 
minimums maintained by common carriers on iron r::tstings 
between Waynesboro and Richmond, Virginia. 
Exhibit 24 is a comparison of the class rate structure in 
Virginia between rail common carriers and motor common 
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c~rriers. It indicates two distinct basis of rates for different 
common carriers. 
Q. Let me interrupt you with respect to Exhibit No. 24. 
I point to the heading, Truck Class 100, and all the other 
numerals under those several headings, and "156" is in 
dollars, or $1.56 Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. There is no dollar mark and no decimal point, and I 
just wanted to clarify that. · 
A. That is correct. 
Exhibit 25 is a comparison of the first and second class 
rates by common carrier truck, Railway Express, 
Vol. I. and air express. The exhibit shows that there is 
page 30 ~ no relationship between the rates maintained by 
the various types of common carriers in Virginia 
on the same class of traffic. Usually rates for specific com-
modities are predicated upon percentages of tl1e correspond-
ing first class rates. This exhibit shows a marked distinc-
tion in the leval of the first class rates maintained by the 
common carriers in Virginia. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, air express is a common carrier, is it 
notT 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, we have got a fourth one involved. We have talked 
about common carrier by motor vehicle, by rail, by express, 
and now you have an exhibit relating to air express. Which 
one of those four common carriers does .Section 46-2 relate 
toY 
A. I wouldn't know, because it merely says "common 
carrier.'' 
Q. Proceed, Mr. Appenzeller. 
A. Exhibit 26 covers common carrier truck versus common 
carrier air express rates on various commodities shown in 
earlier exhibits between points in Virginia and reflects the 
varying rates and minimum weights applicable via these com-
mon carriers. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, will you please tell us 
Vol. I. whether or not du Pont operates plants at various 
page 31 ~ points in Virginia, and what are the principal com-
modities produced at those plants, including the 
locations of the plants Y 
A. Yes, we operate plants at the following points: W aynes-
boro, Ampthill, Bellwood, and Martinsville. We produce 
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acetate yarn, cellulose film, rayon tire cord yarn sulfuric acid, 
carbon bisulphide, and synthetic fibre yarn at these plants. 
Q. Does du Pont ship or cause to be shipped by "for hire" 
carriers, that is, railroads, common carriers by motor ve-
hicle, and contract carriers, these commodities from and to 
points in Virginia? 
A. Yes, we use all three methods of transporting the prod-
ucts produced at our Virginia plants. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, do you ever use Railway Express or 
air express, carriers? 
A. We have. 
Q. Who pays the freight charges on all these shipments f 
A. du Pont pays the transportation charges, with the ex-
ception of sulfuric acid, where freight charges are equalized 
with competitive shipping points. 
Q. In your work for du Pont, are you called upon to inter-
pret the tariffs respecting the freight rates or charges that are 
applicable to the transportation of shipments of the various 
commodities which du Pont makes or receives during the 
course of its operations? 
Vol. I. 
page 32 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. In interpreting those tariffs, do you find it 
sometimes necessary to read the provisions of the various 
laws, rules, and regulations applicable to the publication of 
tarrif s, and things of that sort, both as to interstate and 
foreign cmmnerce as well as intrastate commerce between 
points in Virginia f 
A. Yes, particularly where a controversy arises as to what 
the rate is on a particular commodity from and to specific 
points. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, I will not read to you Section 46-2 of 
the Code of Virginia. Can you tell us what rate or rates are 
shown your Exhibit No. 1 and your other exhibits, that you 
would use as a yardstick by which to measure rates for 
contract carriers intrastate in Virginia pursuant to the 
language in Section 46-2 of the Code f 
A. Section 46-2 of the Code reads: "that it shall be 
unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation-to transport 
any commodity-at a less freight rate or charge than that 
fixed by the State Corporation Commission for a common 
carrier for the same commodity in the same territory.'' 
Exhibit No. 1, as well as the other exhibits, shows the wide 
variance in the published common carrier rates via the several 
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forms of transportation and I would be unable to 
Vol. I. determine ·which of these could be considered a 
page 33 ~ yardstick for establishing contract carrier rates; 
particularly is this true in view of Section 56-276 of 
the Virginia Code, which states the Corporation Commission 
has no authority to fix or prescribe rates for contract carriers. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia did say, in Ma.thieson 
Alkali Works v. Norfolk & }Vestern Railway, 147 Va. 426, 137 
S. E. 608, that the rail rates in Virginia., on intrastate traffic, 
are what are known as "commission-made rates.'' It is my 
opinion that the common carrier motor vehicle rates in Vir-
ginia are not fixed by the State Corporation Commission or 
any other regulatory authority. These motor common carrier 
rates in Virginia are voluntarily established by negotiation 
between shippers and the carriers and those rates published 
in tariffs which are filed with the State Corporation Com-
mission. Moreover, the rates in Virginia by common motor 
vehicle carriers are point-to-point rates and are not estab-
lished by territories, nor are they fixed or established, iJl 
my opinion, by the procedure prescribed by Section 156 (b} 
of the Virginia Constitution and by Section 12-54 of the 
Code. · 
Section 56-306 of the Virginia Code, adopted in 1936, makes 
it the duty of common carriers by motor vehicle 
Vol. I. to establish and observe just and reasonable rates 
page 34 ~ and charges. This portion of the Virginia Act was 
lifted, word for word, from the Interstate Com-
merce Act, Section 216(b), Title 49 U. S. C. A. 1. 
·with reference to Section 216 (b) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission held, ''it 
was in all essentials the same as comparable provisions in 
Pa.rt I, governing rail carriers.'' Dixie Mercerizing Com-
parvJJ v. E. T. & W. N. C. JI{ otor Transportation C01npany, 
41 l\fCC 355, 358. In Mathieson Alkali Works, the case I 
mentioned before, tlle Supreme Court of Virginia tacitly 
acknowledged that rates under Part I of the Interstate Com-
merce Act were voluntarily established and were not com-
mission-prescribed or ''fixed.'' 
Under Section 216(b), Pa.rt II, the Interstate Commerce 
Act, the rates established by common carrier motor vehicles 
are voluntarily established and initiated by the carriers. 
They are recognized as being within the managerial discretion 
of the carriers. I have reference to the following decision of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission: New EnglO!IUl, Motor 
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Carrier Rates, 30 ·MCC 455, 458; Tire Gord Yarn, Ampthill, 
Va., to New Bedford, Mass., 53 MCC 589, 592; Pecks Products 
Company v. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc., et al., 54 MCC 134, 
136. 
The language in the Virginia Act (56-306) being 
Vol. I. identical with that in the Federal Act (216(b) ), 
page 35 ~ the conclusion is inescapable, I think, that . under 
the Virginia Act common carrier motor vehicle 
rates are voluntarily established and maintained. Nor does 
authority to increase these rates under blanket increases in 
revenue cases, constitute approval of any rates so as to make 
them commission-"fixed" rates. I have reference to the 
decisions in Tennessee Prodiwts & Chemical Company v. 
A. G. 8. Railroad, 283 ICC 577, 586; Crown Zellerbach Cor-
poration v. Central of Georgia Railway, 284 ICC 502. 
Section 153 of the Constitution of Virginia clearly limits· 
the term "transportation company" to common carriers. 
That is, those who perform a public service as defined in Sec-
t.ion 156 (b) of the Constitution. The State Corporation Com-
mission is prohibited from fixing the rates of contract carriers 
by Section 153 and Section 156(b) of the Constitution of Vir-
ginia, as well as under 56.273(f) and 56.276 of the Code of 
Virginia. Contract carriers do not owe a public duty nor are 
they public or common carriers. Thus to construe Section 
46-2 of the Virginia Code so as to permit the State Corpora-
tion Commission to fix the rate of contract carriers would 
be equivalent to accomplishing by construction and by indirec-
tion that which is prohibited by the Constitution and laws of 
the State of Virgfaia. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, if I may interrupt you, it 
Vol. I. appears, then, that the General Assembly has 
page 36 ~ specifically recognized five different types of com-
mon carriers of goods, namely, railroad, air, ex-
press, water, and track, as transportation companies ; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, are common carriers intrastate in 
Virginia required to publish tariffs showing the schedule 
of rates and charges to be assessed and file the same with 
the State Corporation Commission? 
A. Section 56-316 of the Code provides that every common 
carrier by motor vehicle shall file with the Commission tariffs 
showing all the rates, charges, et cetera, for transportation, 
and all services in connection therewith, of property between 
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points on its own route and between points on its own route 
and points on the route of any other such carrier, '' or on the 
route of any common carrier by railroad, air, express, or 
water when through routes and joint rates shall have been 
established. '' The tariffs required by this section shall be 
published, filed, and posted in such form and manner, and 
shall contain such information, as the Commission by regula-
tions shall prescribe. 
Section 56-317 of the Code provides that: '' It is unlawful 
for any common carrier to charge other than pub-
Vol. I. lished tariff rates. '' Section 56-318 provides : '' No 
page 37 ~ change shall be made in any rate, fare, charge, or 
classification, or any rule, regulation, or practice 
affecting such rate, fare, charge or classification, or the 
value of the service thereunder, specified in any effective 
tariff of a common carrier or restricted common carrier by 
motor vehicle, except after thirty days' notice of the pro-
posed change, filed and posted in accordance with Section 
56-316. '' However, I believe that the Commission may in its 
discretion, and for good cause shown, allow such change 
npon notice less than that herein specified, or modify the 
requirements of this section with respect to posting and filing 
of tariffs, either in particular instances or by general _order 
applicable to special or peculiar circumstances or condi-
tions. 
Under the provisions of Section 56-318 of the Code, 
there have been instances where the State Corporation Com-
mission permitted motor vehicle common carriers to reduce 
their rates at will, without the necessity of a hearing or 
showing cause as to wl1y such rates should be reduced. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, it appears to me that, through your 
experience and familiarity with these matters, you are quali-
fied as an expert to answer this question: Is Section 46-2 
of the Virginia Code understandable to you under present-day 
conditions Y 
Vol. I. 
page 38 ~ A. No, sir, it is not. 
Q. Is Section 46-2 of the Code, in your opinion, 
vague, indefinite, and uncertain? 
A. It is. 
Q. :Mr. Appenzeller, you have indicated that you have 
supervision of the question of rates for the du Pont Com-
n~ny at VflriouR locations throug;hout the United States. Now, 
have you any knowledge, anywhere else in the United States, 
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of a situation similar to that presented in Virginia by the 
appearance of Section 46-2 in the Code of Virginia? 
A. No; it has been my first experience of this kind. 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, you heard me state to the Notary 
Public before this deposition was taken the understanding 
had with Mr. Muse regarding his reservation of the right to 
cross examine you on your testimony. That is agreeable to 
you, I understand? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And, in conformity with that understanding, will you 
make yourself available for cross examination if Mr. Muse 
desires iU 
A. I will. 
Mr. Bowles: That is all. 
Vol. I. 
page 39 ~ By the Notary : 
Q. Mr. Appenzeller, do you waive the reading 
and signing of this deposition? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(Thereupon, the deposition was concluded.) 
Vol. II. 
Virginia: 
• • • • • 
In the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond Part Two: 
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Mundy Motor Lines, Defendant. 
DEPOSITIONS. 
The depositions of Joseph R. Wyatt and Thomas D. 
Geoghegan taken, pursuant to the annexed notice, before C. L. 
Craig, a Notary Public, at the offices of Messrs. Bowles, 
Anderson & Boyd, 901 Mutual Building, 909 East Main Street, 
Richmond, Virginia, between the hours of two p. m. and five 
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p. m. of the 12th day of April, 1957, to be read as evidence 
on behalf of the plaintiff in the above-entitled cause, pending 
in said court. 
Appearances: Messrs. Bowles, Anderson & Boyd, by 
Aubrey R. Bowles, Jr., Esq., and Jack N. Herod, Esq., a.nd 
Henry E. Ketner, Esq., of Richmond; and ·w. H. Atack, 
Esq., Vfilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for the Plaintiff. 
Vol. II. 
page 2 ~ Leona.rd G. Muse, Esq., Attorney for the De-
fendant. 
Mr. Bowles: Mr. Muse, I call your attention to the fact 
that, in view of the statement made by me at page 2 of his 
deposition, Mr. Charles Appenzeller is present and available 
for cross-examination if vou desire to cross examine him. 
Mr. Muse: For the record, I should like to state that I 
was not present at the taking of the deposition of Mr. Ap-
penzeller, for the reasons stated by Mr. Bowles on page 2 of 
his deposition, as the airport at Roanoke was closed in be-
cause of weather conditions, and there was reserved to me 
the right to cross examine Mr. Appenzeller at this hearing. 
I have considered the deposition of Mr. Appenzeller and 
have discussed it in detail with Mr. J. R. ,vyatt, Traffic 
:Manager of the defendant, Mundy Motor Lines, and have 
been informed by him that the deposition a.nd testimony of 
Mr. Appenzeller is correct and, therefore, I do not exercise 
the right to cross examine Mr. Appenzeller. 
Mr. Bowles: The plaintiff desires to call Mr. Joseph R. 
Wyatt, who, it understands, is vice-president in charge of 
traffic of the defendant, as an adverse witness, under the 
Rule, subject to cross examination. 
Vol. II. 
page 3 ~ JOSEPH R. WYATT, 
called as a witness by the plaintiff and being first 
duly sworn, deposed as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Bowles: 
·Q. Mr. "\Vyatt, will you state your name and residence, 
please? 
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.A. Joseph R. Wyatt; I will give my business address, 
rather than my home address; my business address is 771 
Seventh .A.venue, N. E., Roanoke, Virginia. 
Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity? 
.A. Mundy Motor Lines, in the capacity of vice-president in 
charge of traffic. 
Q. How long have you been in that position f 
A. I have been associated with Mundy Motor Lines going 
on twenty years. 
Q. Prior to serving in that employment, in what kind of 
work were you engaged 7 
A. I was in traffic work for twenty-one years prior to that 
time. In fact, I have been in traffic work all my life. 
Q. Would you please explain to us what your duties are as 
vice-president of Mundy Motor Lines in charge of traffic? 
.A. Well, all problems concerning our operating rights 
under Federal Law and all matters pertaining to 
Vol. II. rates and other matters that would come before the 
page 4 ~ attention of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
come under my jurisdiction. 
Q. Do you hold any office in an association known as the 
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference? 
.A. Yes, I do. 
Q. What is it, please? 
A. I am at present President of that Association and have 
been for three previous years. 
Q. I understand, Mr. Wyatt, that you have for forty-two 
years been engaged in work that was either directly or in a 
supervisory manner connected with freight rates by way 
of rail, motor vehicle, and other forms of common carrier 
or contract carrier service; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Have you been furnished with a copy of the testimony 
of Mr. Charles Appenzeller in this proceeding and copies of 
the exhibits filed by him? 
A. I have, yes. 
Q. Have you had an opportunity to study those exhibits 
and his testimony? 
A. I have. 
Q. Are you familiar with the issues involved in this pro-
ceeding? · 
.A. I believe I am. 
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Q. It concerns the proper freight rate to be 
Vol. II. applied for a truck load movement of synthetic fibre 
page 5 ~ yarn between Martinsville and Roanoke, Virginia, 
I believe, does it not 7 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Is it not a fact that your company had negotiated a 
contract with the plaintiff for a rate of 22 cents per cwt. 
on a minimum of 25,000 lbs T 
A. That is correct. 
Q. That contract is dated the 15th of October, 1956, is it 
not! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I hand you, Mr. \iVyatt, a copy of that agreement, 
which is marked Exhibit A with the petition for declaratory 
judgment filed in this matter, and ask you whether that is an 
accurate copy of the contract to which you refer? 
A. Yes, sir, it is. 
Q. Will you adopt Exhibit A as an exhibit with your testi-
mony? 
A. I do. . 
Q. Now, I believe, sir, that Mr. Mundy, as president of the 
defendant, sent to Mr. Paul J. Keehan a letter on December 
13, 1956, a copy of which I hand you herewith and which 
has been marked Exhibit B with the petition for a declaratory 
judgment, and I ask you whether that is a correct copy of that 
letter? 
Vol. II. 
page 6 ~ A. It is. 
Q. Will you adopt that exhibit so filed as an 
exhibit with your testimony? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I hand you another photostatic copy of a letter dated 
December 17, 1956, from Mr. Paul J. Keehan to Mr. Mundy, 
as President of Mundy Motor Lines, which bas been marked 
as Exhibit C with the petition for declaratory judgment, 
and ask you if this is an accurate copy of the letter written 
by Mr. Keehan? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. WiUyou adopt that as an exhibit with your testimony 
and file it as such Y 
.A. I do. 
Q. Now, Mr. Wyatt, this contract that we have referred 
to as Exhibit A was a contract between du Pont and Mundy 
Motor Lines for the transportation of synthetic fibre yarn 
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between Martinsville, Virginia, and Roanoke, Virginia ; is 
that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. "'Wyatt, in that contract duPont was the only 
consignor and Mundy Motor Lines was the only hauler; 
is that correct? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Mr. vVyatt, was there actually a movement of 
Vol. II. this commodity in both directions between those 
page 7 ~ points pursuant to that contract? 
A. There was. 
Q. I ask you, Mr. Wyatt, to refer now to these exhibits 
prepared by l\Ir. Appenzeller, Nos. 1 through 26, and filed by 
him with his testimony, and I ask you whether or not, in your 
opinion, they are representative of the general condition 
in the State of Virginia with regard to the information shown 
thereon? 
A. Yes, they are representative. 
Q. They do not appear to you, do they, as having been 
carefully hand-picked to establish any preconceived notion of 
a situation, but they reflect what tl1e situation is fairly1 
A. Yes, I am positive they are not hand-picked and I am 
convinced they reflect the conditions that exist through the 
State. 
Q. Have you any comment to make on those exhibits as 
to whether there a re any errors in them or not? 
A. I have not undertaken to verify personally each indi-
. vidual rate involved against the specific tariff cited as au-
thority for that rate, but from my experience I am satisfied 
they are correct. 
Q. Mr. Wyatt, the principal factors to be con-
Vol. II. sidered in fixing a just, reasonable, non-prejudicial, 
page 8 ~ and non-discriminatory rate for common carriers 
are length of haul, volume of movement, value of the 
commodity, density of weight per cubic foot, susceptibility to 
damage, and competition between the various modes of 
transportation, are they not? 
A. Yes, they are important factors we have to consider. 
Q. "'What is the difference between a contract carrier and 
a common carrier by motor vehicle intrastate in Virginia? 
A. Well, I would presume the requirements of a common 
carrier in Virginia are the same as under the Federal Law, 
which w·e are under. We hold ourselves out to serve the 
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public, and as a contract carrier we only serve the individual 
or an individual company under contract. 
Q. The transportation of property for hire in that in-
stance is the result of an individual contract between indi-
viduals; is that correct? 
A. That is right-just for the particular movement. 
Q. And it relates to a truckload or less than truckload of 
one thing sent by one person and hauled by one hauler from 
one place to another on one occasion only; isn't that cor-
rect? 
A. That is correct; it is one movement, one commodity, 
between two specific points which are named. 
Vol. II. 
page 9 ~ Q. Is there any statute which undertakes to limit 
the definition of a contract carrier as to the num-
ber of people you can haul for at any one time 1 
A. It has always been my understanding that you can 
only have shipments for two consignors on any one vehicle 
at any one time. 
Q. Mr. Wyatt, this contract between duPont and Mundy 
is a continuing contract for the hauling of this commodity 
in the manner I have just previously indicated 1 
A. That is right, subject to certain terms of cancellation 
upon written notice as specified in the contract. 
Q. Now, Mr. Wyatt, is your company, Mundy Motor Lines, 
a common carrier by motor vehicle intrastate in Virginia 1 
A. No, sir; only a contract carrier under Virginia Laws. 
Q. Does your company file any tariff in tl1e State of Vir-
ginia for its intrastate contract-carrying business? 
A. No, we do not. 
Q. Does any contract carrier in Virginia. file tariffs for 
such operation? 
A. Not to my knowledge, and my understanding is that 
it is not required. We have never filed one. 
Q. You do not know of any Virginia Law that re-
Vol. II. quires you to file any tariffs for these individual 
page 10 ~ haulings that you have referred to? 
A. During my forty-two years' experience in the 
state, I have never heard of one. 
Q. Now, Mr. Wyatt, I want to ask you this question: 
Rates intrastate for common carriers by motor vehicle have 
never been fixed or prescribed by the .State Corporation Com-
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mission or any other tribunal in the same sense that they 
are fixed or prescribed for railroads, have they? . 
A. Well no. To my knowledge, they use the tariffs of 
motor co~mon carriers in Virginia. I never heard of the 
State Corporation Commission prescribing rates f~r them 
for carriage. It is true that they have to file their rates, 
or they make their own rates and file those rates. I might 
add that those rates become the lawful rates when filed 
with the Commission and unless there is a protest, under 
the procedure of the Commission, those rates become the 
rates. ; 
Q. You are referring now to common carrier rates by 
motor vehicle? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Now, the Constitution of Virginia., and also one of the 
statutes in the Code, sets forth in detail the manner in which 
rates shall be fixed or prescribed by the Commission, does 
it not! 
A. That is my understanding, yes. 
page 11 ~ Q. The Commission does not go through that 
to-do, or follow that procedure in relation to rates 
that are filed and established for common carriers hy motor 
vehicle intra.state in Virginia? 
A. No, it does not. The common carrier truck rates are 
established on a voluntary basis by the particular carrier. 
If Mundy were a common carrier in Virginia, in intrastate it 
would simply file its proposed rates with the Commission. 
Those proposed rates would become the applicable rates 
·without further action, unless there ·,vere protests filed, 
and without any specific authority or action by the Commis-
sion; whereas, common carrier rates of railroads require 
specific authority of the Commission, and that is true as to 
railroads whether they are increased or decreased. 
Q. Now, Mr. Wvatt, I call your attention to the provi-
sions of Section 46-2 of the Code of Virginia, which reads 
as follows: 
''It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation, 
after receiving a license from the Com.missioner as herein 
provided to transport any commodity in anv territory at a 
less freight rate or charge than that fixed by the State 
Corporation Commission for a common carrier for the same 
commodity in the ·same territory.'' 
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page 12 ~ You are familiar with that statute, are you 
not? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. Now, Mr. Appenzeller's Exhibit No. 1 shows the rates 
on synthetic fibre yarn via motor vehicle common carrier 
and by railroad common carrier between Martinsville, Vir-
ginia, and Roanoke, Virginia. Would you tell us what rate 
or rates shown on this Exhibit 1 that you would use as a 
yardstick by which to measure rates for contract carriers 
intrastate in Virginia between those same points on the same 
commodities pursuant to the language of Section 46-2 of 
the Code of Virginia ? 
A. I wouldn't know. I wouldn't know what rate to use. 
Q. Why wouldn't you know? 
A. Well, there are so many rates in there, I wouldn't 
know which to use. The motor carrier rates are one thing in 
one direction and something else in the opposite direction, and 
the rail rates are different. I wouldn't know what to use. 
Q. The Corporation Commission and the statutes of Vir-
ginia recognir.e common carriers by rail, by water, by air, 
by motor vehicle, and by express, do they not f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. No,v, the rates between various points as 
Vol. II. shown on these exhibits made by Mr. Appenseller 
page 13 ~ for the same commodities are with respect to those 
common carriers of property, are they not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you undertook to apply Section 46-2, which one of 
those common carriers would YOU assume that 46-2 referred 
to when it refers to ''common ·carriers''? 
A. I honestlv wouldn't know. 
Q. would you think anybody else could ascertain it? 
A. I think it would be purely a guess for anyone. 
Q. Mr. Vfvatt, why did you pick 38 cents as the rate that 
your company would require in order to comply with the 
terms of vour contract? 
A. I selected the 38 cents, and it obviously had to be a 
guess .in Yiew of the situation as I have testified to and as 
the exhibits show·, but in order to be on the safe side in 
event. that criticism were leveled at Mundy Motor Lines, 
I picked out the hig-hest common carrier rail or motor vehicle 
rate for volume movement. 
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Mr. Bowles: That is all. 
By the Notary: 
Q. Do you waive the reading and signing of your deposi-
tion, Mr. Wyatt? 
A. I do. 
Vol. II. 
page 14 ~ T. D. GEOGHEGAN, 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff and 
being first duly sworn, deposed as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Ketner: 
Q. Please state your name and residence. 
A. T. D. Geoghegan, Transportation Building, Washing-
ton, D. C. 
Q. In what business are you engaged T 
A. I have been engaged for over fifty years in transporta-
tion work before the Interstate Commerce Commission and 
the state regulatory commissions, and the Board of Railroad 
Commissions of Canada. I am now engaged in and have been 
engaged in private practice as a transportation expert in 
preparing and presenting transportation evidence to the 
regulatory bodies just referred to. In addition, I have ap-
peared before both federal and state courts in similar ca-
pacities. 
Q. Please -explain in some detail your qualifications as a 
rate and tariff expert. 
A. I entered the service of the Southern Railway Company 
in 1903 in Louisville, Kentucky, in the office of tb-e Assistant 
Freight Traffic Manager. After working there for several 
months I was transferred to another department. 
Vol. II. I returned to the Louisville office in 1905 and in the 
page 15 ~ same year was sent to Atlanta, Georgia, as Traffic 
Clerk in the compilation and preparation of tariffs 
covering- freight over the Southern Railway and other lines. 
In 1907 I was transferred to the Vice-President's office as 
rate clerk, in charge of rate quotations, rate studies, and 
analysis. In 1909 I was sent to Columbia, South Carolina, 
to the division freight office at that point, having charge 
of most of the State of South Carolina served by the Southern 
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Railway. In 1910 I was again sent to Atlanta as Assistant 
Chief Clerk in the Traffic Department. In 1911 I was trans-
ferred back to vVashington headquarters as head rate clerk, 
and 1912 I was appointed Chief Clerk to the Vice-President 
in charge of traffic. I continued in that position until Septem-
ber, 1917, when I was appointed Traffic Manager of Gulf, 
Mobile & Northern Railroad Company, an independent line. 
During the First ,v orld ,var, in addition to the position just 
ref erred to, I also served with the Railroad Administration 
in Atlanta, having charge of rates in the .States of Georgia 
and South Carolina. On July 1, 1921, I returned to Washing-
ton, D. C., with the U. S. Railroad Administration as 
Traffic Assistant, having to do with rate litigation before the 
Interstate Commerce Commissoin on questions of unreason-
ableness of rates arising during the period of 
Vol. II. Federal control. September 1923 I resigned from 
page 16 ~ the U. S. Railroad Administration and entered 
private practice as a rate consultant with offices 
in the Transportation Building, Washington, D. C., represent-
ing shipper organizations and others before the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, and have continued in that ever 
since. 
Q. Are you familiar with the tariffs or supplements pub-
lished and filed with the State Corporation Commission of 
Virginia and other regulatory authorities, such as the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, by the various for-hire carriers, 
including railroads, Railway Express Company, motor vehicle 
carriers, and water lines? 
A. Yes; I have been f a.miliar with those tariffs during a 
long period of years, both as to their intrastate application 
as well as interstate. From this it will be noted that I have 
during this period had experience in the making of tariffs, 
filing of ta riffs, and interpretation of tariffs, as well as 
analythal studies of tariffs before the regulatory authorities 
I have just ref erred to. 
Q. You have, in fact, been engaged in this type of work 
that you speak of all of your adult life; isn't that true? 
A. In my entire business experience I have been connected 
with trnnsporntion work. 
Q. Mr. Geoghegan, dealing particularly with the 
Vol. TI. freight rate situation in Virginia, both as to inter-
page 17 ~ state rates from and to Virginia and intrastate 
rates within Virginia, what experience, if any, 
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over the years have you had in preparing testimony and 
presenting testimony before the regulatory authorities, and 
in some instances Federal Courts, dealing with these rates? 
A. I have appeared before the State Corporation Commis-
sion of Virginia, the North Carolina Commission, and the 
South Carolina Commission as traffic representative, dealing 
with the rate structure involved in proceedings before those 
com.missions. During the period from 1923 to date, I have 
been employed on numerous occasions by the State Cor-
poration Commission of Virginia to present testimony deal-
ing with the Virginia rate situation. I have also been em-
ployed on numerous occasions by Virginia shippers to present 
testimony to the State Corporation Commission dealing with 
intrastate rates in Virginia and to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission respecting interstate rates from Virginia to inter-
state destinations. 
Q. Mr. Geoghegan, please explain in some detail what ex-
perience you have had and indicate some of the principal 
cases in which you have participated over the past thirty 
years or more as a rate and tariff expert on behalf of the 
State Corporation Commission of Virginia and Virginia 
shippers dealing with freight rates interstate and intrastate 
in Virginia. 
A. I have been retained by the State Corpora-
Vol. II. tion Commission of Virginia, as previously stated, 
page 18 ~ to participate as a traffic witness on interstate 
cases involving rates from Virginia to other states, 
the Eastern Class Rate Investigation, the North Carolina 
Class Rate Case, the Kentucky Class Rate Case, involving 
class rates interstate to and from Kentucky, Fruit and 
Vegetable Case, from Virginia to points ea.st of the Miss-
issippi, rates on brick, rates on lime, rates on limestone, and 
numerous cases involvine; rates on coal from points in West 
Virginia to points in Virginia. I also appeared before the 
Interstate Commerce Commission in the Section 13 case, 
intrastate in Virginia, on account of some of the receivers of 
coal in the Western part of the state. In the coal eases 
above referred to, I also appeared on behalf of the receivers 
of coal located in Virginia from the West Virginia State 
Line to Norfolk. There are quite a few of thes·e cases wl1ich 
I appeared in, as the records show. 
Q. In these various rate cases to which you refer 
in addition to presenting rate testimony, did you also in som~ 
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of the cases present cost studies dealing with the railroad 
costs in transporting the commodities involved? 
A. Yes, in some of the coal cases and in the Fruit and 
Vegetable Case, and perhaps others, I presented cost testi-
mony. 
Vol. II. Q. Have you represented other state regulatory 
page 19 ~ bodies in connection with their rate problems? 
A. I have been employed by the Florida Rail-
road Commission in connection with the Fruit and Vegetable 
Case, by the .State of Mississippi in connection with railway 
acquisition in that state, the Alabama State Docks Commis-
sion with respect to rates to and via the Alabama State Docks, 
the six New England State Commissions with respect to milk 
rates from New York and New England to Boston, Massachu-
setts, territory. In addition thereto, I have represented At-
lantic Steamship Lines in connection with transcontinental 
railway freight rates, public utilities with respect to coal 
rates, Washington, D. C. newspapers with respect to their 
transportation problems, barge lines on the Mississippi and 
Warrior Rivers with respect to water transportation rates, 
and truck lines operating in the Southeastern Territory in 
connection with petroleum rates in tank truck lots. 
Q. Have you at any time represented as a traffic expert, or 
transportation expert, any railway company in a foreign 
country? 
A. Yes ; in 1952 to 1955 I made a study of International 
Railways of Central America, operating in Guatemala and 
Salvador. In this case I made a twenty-year study of its 
operations and a comparison with the operation of 
Vol. II. Class I United States railroads. That was a pro-
page 20 ~ ceeding before the Supreme Court of New· York 
County, in New York State, involving rates and 
transportation costs over the International Railways of 
Central America. This was a stockholders' derivative suit 
against the railways and United Fruit Company, involving 
about fifty million dollars damages. The stockholders ·em-
ployed me. We are expecting a decision in this case any 
day. 
Q. Mr. Geoghegan, are you familiar with the issue involved 
in this pro0eeding being heard today? 
A. Yes. I have read the ·petition of the plaintiff and · the 
defendant's answer. As I understand it, the case has to do 
with the proper rate to apply for movement by motor vehicle 
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contract carriers of synthetic fibre yarn between Martinsville 
and Roanoke. Q. Have you had the opportunity to analyze the twenty-
six rate exhibits presented by Mr. Charles L. Appenzeller m 
this proceeding? 
A. Yes. Q. Have you also had an opportunity to read a transcript 
of Mr. Appenzeller's testimony in connection with these ex-
hibits? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Based on your analysis of the exhibits and testimony 
presented by Mr. Appenzeller, do you concur generally with 
Mr. Appenzeller's testimony? 
Vol. II. 
page 21 ~ A. Yes, I agree with and concur in the testimony 
offered by Mr. Appenzeller. I think he has made 
a very fair and comprehensive presentation of the confused 
situation of the issue involved in the common carrier trans-
portation rates as set forth in his Exhibits. 
Q. Mr. Geoghegan, I invite your attention to Section 46-2 
of the Code of Virginia which reads as follows: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, 
after receiving a license from the Commissioner as herein 
provided to transport any commodity in any territory at a 
less freight rate or charge than that fixed by the State Cor-
poration Commission for a common carrier for the same 
commodity in the same territory.'' 
My question is, can you, as a rate and tariff expert, tell 
us what rate or rates shown on Mr. Appenzeller's Ex1libit 
No. 1 you would use as a yardstick by which to measure rates 
for contract carriers intrastate in Virginia, pursuant to the 
languag-P- in Section 46-2 of the Code? 
A. I would not know what common carrier rate or rates 
shown on Mr. Appenzeller's Exhibit No. 1 to use as a yard-
stick to ascertain the proper rate between Martins-
Vol. II. ville and Roanoke. The rates are not the same in 
page 22 ~ both directions, and they differ widely, lmsed on 
volume of loading. In addition thereto, I call at-
tention to the fact that Section 46-2 does not state what 
type of common carrier rate should be used, so one is left 
completely in the dark as to what is meant by that language 
in the statute. Furthermore, the type of service rendered 
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by the diff.erent types of common carriers' rates shown on 
Exhibit No. 1 differs very materially, and the rate that may 
be reasonable for a rail carrier and a motor vehicle common 
carrier may vary materially from the type of service rendered 
by a contract carrier, so that in my judgment the common 
carrier rate shown on Exhibit No. 1 by no means represents 
a proper yardstick by which to measure the contract carrier 
rates bet-ween these two points in the State of Virginia. 
Q. Would your answer with respect to ]\fr. Appenzeller's 
Exhibits 2 to 26, inclusive, be similar to what you have said 
with respect to his Exhibit No. 1? 
A. Yes, that is true. In an analysis of these exhibits I 
find that there is no relation developed on each of these ex-
hibits in the rates established by common carrier trucks, by 
common carrier railway express, and by common carrier air 
express. An analysis shows that all of these rates differ in 
amounts between the same points, on the same commodities, 
and differ in different directions, in addition to 
Vol. II. variations based on the volume of the load. ·with 
page 23 ~ the ambiguity of Bection 46-2, which covers a 
broad term, there is absolutely no way for a practi-
cal rate man to determine which is the proper yardstick to use 
in constructing the contract carrier truck rate between any 
two points in the State of Virginia. 
Q. Would you say that Section 46-2 is so vague and in-
definite as to he unenforceable? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Geoghegan, I invite your special attention to the 
word "territory'' mentioned twice in Section 46-2 of the 
Code. vVhat would be your interpretation of the meaning of 
this word as there used in reference to the freight rate or 
charge '' for the same commodity in the same territory'' Y 
A. In addition to the differences I have just outlined, there 
comes up the question of the word "territory" in this section. 
As we understand the word "territory" in rate-making, or 
rate parlance, ''territory" covers a rather large area. The 
word "territory" as used in Section 46-2 seems to apply 
mostly to railroads, as motor carrier rates are usually on a 
point-to-point basis. The individual carriers have generally 
published their own rates based upon their own individual 
operations and there have been no general rates established 
for motor vehicles similar to those approved by the State 
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Corporation Commission with respect to the movement by 
rail. 
Vol. II. 
page 24 ~ Q. Mr. Geoghegan, are you familiar with the 
several reports and orders issued by the State 
Corporation Commission in Case No. 3102, which was initiated 
by the Commission on January 24, 1927 Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. I hand you a pamphlet headed '' Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, State Corporation Commission,'' dated November 14, 
1929, Case No. 3102. Will you please explain what this case, 
that is, the original case, and the numerous supplemental 
orders issued by the Commission involve T 
A. The original case, No. 3102, involved an investigation 
instituted by the State Corporation Commission of the classi-
fication and class rate structure throughout the State of Vir-
ginia as related to rail and water line rates. The supple-
mental orders cover amendments made in the original de-
cision by the State Corporation Commission, some of which 
resulted from the North Carolina case previously ref erred to 
by me, which brought about a further reduction in the south-
ern territory portion of the State of Virginia. 
Mr. Ketner: I would like to have this plamphlet which 
Mr. Geoghegan has just discussed marked as Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit No. 27. That is the only copy of that 
Vol. II. pamphlet I have and I would like to have per-
page 25 ~ mission from the parties of record here, if I may; 
to withdraw it for my further use in this proceed-
ing. 
Mr. Muse: Consent is granted by the Mundy Motor 
Lines. 
By Mr. Ketner: 
Q. Mr. Geoghegan, did you participate on behalf of Vir-
ginia Shippers Association as a rate and traffic expert in 
this proceeding, No. 31027 · 
A. I did, and I presented testimony and evidence in con-
nection with this statewide revision. 
Q. Mr. Geoghegan, do you know whether or not all the 
railroads and water lines operating in Virginia at that time 
and the shipper interests throughout the .State were given 
notice by the Commission of the hearing in this proceeding? 
A. Yes; that is true. 
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Q. Do you know whether or not there were a number of 
hearings held by the Commission in this proceeding? 
A. There were. There was a comprehensive investigation 
of the classification and the class rate structure in Virginia. 
Q. Did the Commission, by its report and order or orders 
in this proceeding, in your opinion, prescribe or fix the rail-
road class rate structure in Virginia? 
A. It did. The class rate structure prescribed 
Vol. II. by the State Corporation Commission in this pro-
.pag-e 26 ~ ceeding was the new rate structure to be applied 
by the rail and water carriers in Virginia. 
Q. Do you know if the State Corporation Commission has 
ever instituted any such investigation dealing with motor 
vehicle common carrier rates intrastate in Virginia as it 
did in Case No. 3102, dealing with railroad rates Y 
A. No, it has not. 
Q. Mr. Geoghegan, in your opinion, has the State Corpora-
tion Commission fixed or prescribed motor vehicle common 
carrier rates intrastate in Virginia T 
A. In my opinion, the State Corporation Commission has 
never fixed or prescribed motor vehicle common carrier rates 
in Virginia. 
Q. What is the authority for the Commission to fix or pre-
scribe motor vehicle common carrier rates? 
A. The Commission has authority to prescribe motor ve-
hicle common carrier rates under the Virginia Constitution 
and Section 56-305 of the Code. Section 56-305, however, 
applies only to common or restricted common carriers. In 
this connection, I invite attention to the language in Section 
56-276 of the Code which specifically provides: 
"That the Commission shall not have the power to regulate 
or control the rates or charges of contract carriers by motor 
vehicle.'' 
A reading of these two sections, 56-276 and 
Vol. II. 56-305, shows very clearly that the Legislature 
page 27 ~ recognizes that the Commission could not fix or 
prescribe the rates for contract carriers in any 
way whatsoever. 
Q. Mr. Geoghegan, over the years in your work dealing 
with freig-ht rates and tariffs of for-hire carriers, have you 
had occasion to read the various laws, rules, and regulations 
governing the publication of their tariffs Y 
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A. I have. 
Q. In all of your experience in dealing with freight rates 
and tariffs, have you ever run across a situation similar 
to that presented by Section 46-2 of the Code? 
A. No, sir. In my fifty years of rate experience I have 
never been faced with a situation like that brought about by 
Section 46-2, and in my opinion the section is completely im-
possible of application. 
Q. Do you consider Section 46-2 workable? 
A. No. 
Q. Please explain your reasons for making that answer. 
A. 1st. You must first determine what is meant by the 
word ''territory.'' Does it mean between two points, a dozen 
points, or one hundred miles, or a large or small segment of 
the total State area? 
2nd. You must then determine what was in-
Vol. II. tended by the words '' common carrier'' in the 
page 28 } singular. The Code recognizes five types of com-
mon carriers. 
3rd. Even if you could determine which one of the five 
types of common carriers Section 46-2 has reference to, 
you must still further determine what rates that carrier 
publishes and files with the State Corporation Commission 
between the points in question and the traffic under which 
said rates apply. 
4th. You must then, in addition, determine whether the 
rates so found are voluntary carrier-made rates, or rates 
prescribed and fixed by the State Corporation Commission. 
5th. If fixed by the State Corporation Commission, you 
are then faced with minimum rates fixed without due notice, 
no hearing, and a decision not based upon evidence from 
either the shipper or the carrier, thus fixing minimum rates 
for contract carriers when the State Corporation Commission 
has no power to fix minimum rates. 
6th. From all this it can be seen that, not only is Section 
46-2 vague, indefinite, and unenforceable, but that the con-
tract carrier rate, if intended in Section 46-2 under this 
formula or approach, is one that is in violation of the due 
process theory of regulation by the State Corporation Com-
mission which requires due notice, hearing of evidence from 
all parties, and a decision based upon the law and the evi-
dence. 
Vol. II. 
page 29 } 7th. A decision by the State Corporation Com-
mission after such a course of procedure, in any 
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event, would still be in violation of Section 56-276 of the 1950 
Code. 
Mr. Ketner: That is all. 
Mr. Muse: Let the record show that on behalf of the de-
fendant, I do not desire to cross examine Mr. Geoghegan. 
By the Notary: 
Q. Do you waive the reading and signing of your deposi-
tion, Mr. Geoghegan? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(Depositions concluded.) 
• • • • • 
A Copy-Teste: 
H. G. TURNER, Clerk. 
H. G. TURNER, Clerk. 
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